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Abstract 
Convergence theory has dominated the discussion of global financial governance. The 
perspective argues that the confrontation between the global market and state institutions leads to 
policy convergence. However, rather than accept this conclusion, this study has examined 
banking regulation in four countries, the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany to test 
whether they converge. By comparing how these countries regulate banking in terms of policy 
interests, the study finds that there is indeed divergence between them in contrast to what 
convergence theory would predict.  
!"!
Preface 
This thesis marks the end of a two-year program at the Norwegian University for Science and 
Technology. I would therefore like to take the opportunity to extend my gratitude to my supervisor, 
Jonathon Moses of the Department of Sociology and Political Science, for expertly guiding my 
process. I would also like to thank my wife, Emily Thuswaldner, for putting her career aside and 
accompanying me to Norway so that I could complete this degree. 
Trondheim, 15.05.2012, 
 
Peder Sørås 
! #!
 
Contents 
!"#$%&'(%#)*+,(-(%.#/01212#(34#*&5,0#2+1672# 8!
9"#7+,&0,71/(%#/&3/,*72# :!
9"!#7+,&0,71/(%#'(/;$0&)34# <<!#$"$%!&'(!)&*+,&+*-.!-//*0-,'1!,023(*4(2,(!&'(0*5! %"!#$"$"!-66*())724!&'(!-))+8/&702)! %9!#$"$#!&'(!72&(*2-&702-.!*(4+.-&0*5!,00*672-&702!806(.! %:!
="#/(2,2#(34#,>*,/7(71&32# !?!
="<#/(2,#2,%,/71&3# !?!
="!#,>*,/7(71&32# !!!
@"#4(7(# !=!
@"<#'(2,%# !=!:$%$%!,.+;!2(40&7-&702! "<!
@"!#/&)370A#/(2,2# 9?!:$"$%!&'(!=72-2,7-.!,*7)7)! #%!:$"$"!&'(!;-2>724!)(,&0*)! #?!:$"$#!8-72!*(4+.-&0*5!;067()!-26!.(47).-&702! 99!:$"$9!*(@+7*(8(2&)!-26!)&-26-*6)! :"!
!"#"!$=726724)! <?!
B"#(3(%A212# B8!<$%$%!&'(!+)! <A!<$%$"!,-2-6-! ?B!<$%$#!&'(!(+! ?%!<$%$9!&'(!+>! ?"!<$%$:!4(*8-25! ?#!
B"!#/&3-,0$,3/,#&0#41-,0$,3/,C# 8@!<$"$%!4.0;-..5! ?:!<$"$"!2-&702-.!67.+&702! ??!
B"9#/&D*,7171&3E#41-,0$,3/,C# F=!
8"#/&3/%)21&3# FB!
8"<#14,(2#6&0#6)07+,0#0,2,(0/+.# F8!
F"#0,6,0,3/,2# FF!
 
 
!9!
1. Introduction 
In response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 there have been major attempts to 
restructure the regulation of banks. In the spirit of neoliberalism, it has been assumed that these 
attempts are driven by globalization in the form of competition between the market, (as an 
abstract constellation of decentralized individuals and firms)1 and national institutions.2 
According to this perspective, globalization increases the number and power of actors in the 
market and consequently leads to policy convergence at the market’s terms. To further contribute 
to the discussion of global financial regulation, this study aspires to investigate this claim. 
However, rather than accept the conclusions of neoliberal convergence theory, it aims to test the 
assumption that the confrontation between the global market and state institutions leads to policy 
convergence. This test, based on an empirical assessment of bank regulation in the United States, 
Canada, Britain, and Germany, indicates an increasing divergence in state regulation. 
The scholarship on global financial regulation has been dominated by one filter of analysis, 
neoliberal convergence theory. The key to this theory lies in its reliance on the explanatory power 
of global market structures in shaping a single ‘best practice’ preference for policy amongst 
exposed states. It would be interesting then to note divergence between the ways that states 
govern finance. As this paper argues, one of the areas where this occurs is in bank regulation. 
Policies that govern banks depend on technical specifications where minor deviations can have 
significant impacts. Examining such policies in detail will enable us to assess the presence of 
divergence. 
The study will aim at investigating this puzzle by observing national policies. It will examine 
these as dynamic state interests* rather than assume they are the result of the structural forces of 
the global financial market, and in this way provide a new perspective on a contemporary issue. 
Innate and possibly diverging interests are not included as a factor in the convergence model, 
thus observing bank regulation in this perspective will make it possible to examine global trends 
in a more fulfilling way. Naturally, the key to rejecting market caused convergence lies in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bruner, C. M., & Abdedal, R. (2005). To Judge Leviathan: Sovereign Credit Ratings, National Law, and the World Economy. Journal of Public 
Policy , 25 (2), pp. 191-217: 191 
2 Drezner, D. W. (2007). All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. Oxford, United Kingdom: Princeton University 
Press: preface 
* It should be noted that the aim is not to study path dependent interests in the way of variegated capitalism typically associated with Hall and 
Soskice (Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of Capitalism- The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.) but rather understanding policy interests as fluent and changeable. 
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assessing relevant policies, the area where the theory claims there will be decreased variance. By 
comparing different examples, it becomes clear that these policies have diverged despite the 
dominant assumption.  
Other studies have argued for the presence of financial regulatory divergence before, however 
this study seeks to distance itself by first specifying on the particular topic of banking. As will be 
seen in chapter ‘"$!4CDEFC!GHIJFKFC1!,LMNMN!FOP!HDQJL!NIMRSN’ this topic is especially relevant to 
the contemporary regulatory reform. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08 (GFC) has in many 
ways reset the stage for financial regulation and increased the potency of examining global 
trends. In scrutinizing how countries have responded to the crisis, we get a fresh introduction to 
regulatory policy. This will be done by operationalizing and comparing the relevant regulatory 
policies of four different country examples; the United States, Canada, Britain, and Germany. 
The findings of this study suggest that there is an increasing divergence in the policies that 
regulate the activities of banks. 
First, the background of financial crisis reform will be discussed in order to point out how the 
setting is optimal for this type of study. This explanation will underline how the results will be 
limited to indicating tendencies in possible permanent changes due to the temporal proximity of 
the financial crisis. Following, the discussion will conceptualize convergence as a measurable 
variable. This is easier said than done, considering the extensive previous literature on the 
subject. It is therefore natural to follow the discussion of the concept with a section considering 
this previous literature. Combined, these two sections will argue that the hypothesis should be 
assessed through an examination of national interests using a method of two-step analysis 
developed by Legro and Moravcsik.3  
The two-step method lends itself to the study of country cases by examining and contrasting 
domestic political interests with international outcomes. As mentioned, this study will focus on 
four country examples, the United States, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. These will 
be presented and discussed in terms of their contribution within the theoretical framework. As 
will be explained in this section, it is pertinent to also understand international regulation through 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Legro, J. W., & Moravcsik, A. (1999 Autumn). Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security , 24 (2), pp. 5-55. 
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both the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the EU as part of fully 
appreciating international outcomes. 
Section five will concern the empirical findings, subdivided into chapters on Basel negotiations, 
financial policy preferences and structures, policies, and policy methods and instruments based 
on the perspective prescribed in the theoretical outline. These findings will then be compared in 
the subsequent analysis section. This section will show how the empirical findings support 
expectations based on the theoretical framework that indicate a divergence in bank regulation 
between the four country cases. Firstly, the BCBS governance of banks has broken down and 
secondly, as this breakdown indicates; there are significant country differences in the 
aforementioned aspects of policy. Finally, the analysis will conclude by reiterating the study’s 
main findings and presenting some possible new directions of study. 
Why does this matter? 
The analysis will add to the body of work on globalization. More specifically it will expand the 
discussion by challenging one of the assumptions behind it; that globalized markets lead to 
converging policies. The study will add to a contemporary development in the research frontier 
where this phenomenon is observed. Other recent analyses that question the neoliberal 
assumption have found that despite the increasing integration of the global economy, there is a 
growing freedom for states to act independently.4 By focusing on the regulation of banks, this 
study is able to go into detail in capturing this growing political autonomy. 
There are continual efforts between state leaders to meet at the global level to formalize 
regulatory standards. Arguably, markets rely on such rules and norms to function properly.5 
Therefore it is of great importance to analyze the influencing factors on these overarching 
agreements, be they formal or informal in nature. Analyzing the nuances of globalization, rather 
than accepting the concept as the abstract phenomenon it is often presented as, should add a 
tangible addition to a complete understanding of how global markets are regulated. Addressing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Helleiner, E., & Pagliari, S. (2011). The End of an Era in International Financial Regulation? A Postcrisis Research Agenda. International 
Organization , 65 (Winter), pp. 169-200; Hassel, A., & Lutz, S. (2010). Does the Financial Crisis Help to Overcome the Crisis of the State? 
(Durch die Krise aus der Krise. Die neue Starke des Staates). Der Moderne Staat Heft , 3 (2), pp. 251-271; Drezner, D. W. (2007) 
5 Drezner (2007) 
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the GFC makes this particularly relevant in terms of understanding the political possibilities that 
follow a crisis.  
2. Global upheaval: Crisis and power shifts 
‘The global nature of the crisis provides analysts with particularly favourable 
conditions to advance this kind of comparative research agenda by exploring how 
this simultaneous shock has generated convergent or conflicting responses in 
different countries.’6  
The subprime crisis revealed how large the extent of global financial integration has become. 
There have been other financial upheavals in recent times, but none have affected the overall trust 
in the global economic system to the same extent. The GFC has put demands on governments to 
respond to an ostensibly broken financial system. Because the crisis emerged from the financial 
sector, regulators are facing unprecedented scrutiny, most importantly from the general public.7 If 
there were divergent discrepancies in the responses of similar states to these demands it would 
indicate that globalization does not force states to converge, but rather that other influencing 
factors must be addressed also. 
Notably, the crisis most severely affected the states closest associated with promoting the Anglo-
American financial regime. It will therefore be interesting to see whether this has had an effect on 
how global banking is regulated. Possibly, through delegitimizing the Anglo-American regime, 
the crisis has opened for the involvement of other actors.8 According to Benne, Peck and 
Theodore, ‘many prominent commentators have claimed that the ideologies and practices of free-
market capitalism, or neoliberalism, have been discredited, and that a new era of regulatory 
reform, based on aggressive state interventionism to restrain market forces, is dawning’.9 This 
could possibly indicate a new consensus around which states will converge. However, rather than 
accept this as a new era of consensus, the study will evaluate the new reform to discover how 
states have responded to this impetus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Helleiner and Pagliari (2011): 181. 
7 Holmquist, J. (2009). Financial Services Roundtables: EU-US Cooperation in Financial Markets Regulation in Times of Crisis. Washington DC: 
3 
8 Helleiner, E. (2010). A Bretton Woods Moment? The 2007-2008 Crisis and the Future of Global Finance. International Affairs , 86 (3), pp. 619-
636. 
9 Brenner, N., Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). After Neoliberalization? Globalizations , 7 (3), pp. 327-345: 328  
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Others have looked at this puzzle before. For example, in their analysis of post crisis behaviour, 
Hassel and Lutz agree with Helleiner and Pagliari that states appear to be able to act decisively 
more independently than previously recognized.10 This further confirms that despite economic 
integration, states can behave in distinctively divergent patterns. By exploring the proposed 
research question, this study will examine this puzzling evidence that contrasts the expectation 
that only global market power matters. This study will differ however, by examining one 
particular aspect of global finance that is especially relevant to both the topic and the crisis, 
namely banking. 
Because the banking sector was at the centre of the GFC,11 the following analysis will focus on 
the regulation of this sector as its centre of analysis. In their convincing study of financial crises, 
Reinhart and Rogoff emphasize the centrality of the banking sector in crisis events.12 Indeed, the 
independence and subsequent regulatory capture by leading banks is by many respected 
commentators thought to be among the main causal factors of the crisis.13 Arguably, the 
significance of banks have politicized the financial market incrementally, forcing policy makers 
to devote much of their attention to the specific topics of liquidity management rules, higher 
capital requirements and risk management calculations.14 Therefore these are the main policy 
instruments to be assessed in this paper. Accordingly, the banking sector is an ideal field for a 
study of convergence theory. Banking regulation is a policy area characterized both by a high 
pressure for globalization and a history of nationally diverging systems and mechanisms.15 There 
is evidence of incentives for both policy- convergence and divergence, providing the opportunity 
to examine how states react to these pressures. 
An obstacle that this study encounters is the pace of policy change. As French historian Fernand 
Braudel writes: ‘new international financial systems are a product more of a medium-term 
‘conjunctural’ historical process than of the fast paced ‘histoire evenementielle’ that preoccupies 
journalists.’16 Such processes take time and we are likely only seeing the beginnings of regulatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Hassel and Lutz (2010). 
11 Quaglia, L. (2010). The 'Old' and 'New' Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the EU. Observatoire Social Europeen. OSE. 
12 Carmen M. Reinhart og Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
13 Baker, A. (2010). Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance. 
International Affairs , 86 (3), pp. 647-663: 647 
14 Helleiner, E., & Pagliari, S. (2010). Crisis and the Reform of International Financial Regulation. In E. Helleiner, S. Pagliari, & H. Zimmermann 
(Eds.), Global Finance in Crisis: The Politics of International Regulatory Change (pp. 1-18). New York, NY, United States: Routledge. 
15 Andreas Busch, Banking Regulation and Globalization (Oxford University Press, 2009): 15 
16 Fernand Brandel as quoted in: Helleiner (2010): 627 
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regime change. To explain this, Ian Begg identifies three distinct phases of a crisis; ‘firefighting’, 
or rapid responses to prevent systemic collapse; ‘stimulation’, or recapitalizing the economy; and 
the more long-term recasting of regulatory systems phase that is currently unravelling.17 As a 
result, this study will focus on the emerging tendencies in the fields of regulation policy, 
processes, and institutions framed. As such, this will necessarily be a study of short-term 
responses within the ongoing process of change, and will only generate hypotheses on whether 
the tendencies discovered can be considered indicators of more permanent changes in the practice 
of financial regulation. 
3. Theoretical Concepts 
3.1 Understanding and operationalizing convergence 
Convergence theory assumes that financial globalization as the confrontation between global 
markets and state institutions enforces converging economic policies. Because this discussion 
will be narrowed down by a focus on financial regulation, it is first necessary to specify what the 
convergence of financial regulation entails. This deliberation will point to the factors that the 
following study will attempt to measure. 
Leaning on previous research we can draw on the defining categories of others. The literature 
captures financial regulation under the umbrella term ‘policy convergence’.18 This refers to the 
‘convergence in the policies pursued (or the paradigms informing) particular states.’19 According 
to Colin Bennett, policy can be understood to encompass policy goals, policy content, policy 
instruments, policy outcomes, or policy style.20 As Bennett argues, however, the policies adopted 
by different governments oftentimes do not fit into the same ‘conceptual categories’,21 and these 
categories should only be taken as guidelines. The analysis will draw on these guidelines to 
determine which factors to examine in assessing the final convergence criteria. 
Daniel Drezner refines the definition of policy convergence in terms of the more measureable 
variable regulatory coordination. In the broad context such coordination entails the ‘codified !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Begg, I. (2009). Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis. Journal of Common 
Market Studies , 47 (5), pp. 1107-1128: 1111 
18 Hay, C. (2004 May). Common Trajectories, Variable Paces, Divergent Outcomes? Models of European Capitalism under Conditions of 
Complex Economic Interdependence. Review of International Political Economy , 11 (2), pp. 231-262. 
19 Ibid.: 8 
20 Bennet, C. J. (1991 April). What is Policy Convergence and What Causes it? British Journal of Political Science , 21 (2), pp. 215-233: 218 
21 Ibid.: 218 
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adjustment of national standards in order to recognize or accommodate regulatory frameworks 
from other countries.’22 This definition deviates from the standard definition of policy 
convergence as it addresses coordination rather than convergence. Coordination can occur when 
convergence does not, although not the other way around as it implies a deliberate effort. As will 
be pointed out in chapter ‘#$"!&IJDLJSMUFC!;FUVWLDGOP’, defining convergence this way allows 
for a better understanding of national interests whilst still capturing the concept of convergence. 
In this understanding, coordination happens at the cost of one country and in favour of another 
rather than as the result of a common motion towards an abstract goal. In terms of observing 
convergence, the two terms are synonymous, as both would show up as a lack of variety between 
country policies. 
Measuring variation in this variable relies on first assuming that a state’s ideal base to build on is 
its pre-existing national regulatory framework.23 This assumption is based on a conclusion that 
regulatory issues are necessarily domestic problems before they reach the international stage.24 
To measure the differences in policy between the cases the study will rely on Legro and 
Moravcsik’s ‘two-step’ approach. This approach compares preferences shaped by domestic actors 
and institutions with international outcomes to determine their distribution along capabilities and 
power of the state actors in question.25 In the banking sector, regulation tends to be subdivided 
into policies on capital requirements, leverage, liquidity and credit rating. As mentioned, the 
policy response to the crisis has been consequent in this. To find convergence (or alternately 
divergence) in the national standards it is therefore necessary to catalogue these factors. Bennet’s 
policy categories will be helpful in guiding this effort. Bank regulations are relatively specific 
and ample for comparison, however any differences are likely to be subtle due to their technical 
nature.  
The next step is to assess how these policies recognize or accommodate the standards of other 
models. To do so we must first understand the nature of existing models. Regulatory convergence 
can be the result of coordinated harmonization through international law, economic integration, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Drezner (2007): 11 
23 Ibid.: 40 
24 Ibid.: 40 
25 Legro and Moravcsik (1999): 24 
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or domestic factors.26 Other models could therefore include that of another state, in which case 
we would measure !- Convergence, which ‘occurs if there is a decrease in variation of policies 
among the countries under consideration’,27 or that of a transnational agreement, in which case 
the focus would be on "- convergence, or comparing countries’ changes in discrepancies to an 
exemplary model. This study has focused on the Basel Commission of Banking Supervision’s 
(BCBS) recommendations for banking regulation as the exemplary model and has furthermore 
chosen four countries that will be discussed in section ‘9$%!,FNJ!)JCJUSMDO’ as country models. It 
should be noted that convergence is a process rather than a fixed state,28 and this study will refer 
to the study of countries ‘becoming’ more alike as opposed to existing similarities. 
The next section will discuss the theoretical background to this discussion. It is necessary to 
evaluate this background before we can make any specific predictions. These predictions (see 
chapter ‘9$"!(XHJUSFSMDON’) will relate to the discussed conceptualization of convergence. 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
Overview 
Structural convergence theory is the one dominating model that shapes the discussion of financial 
globalization. The perspective predicts policy convergence based on states’ interaction with the 
external force of globalism. Several influential studies point to the impotency of states in the face 
of this force.29 The following discussion will provide an overview of previous research within 
this perspective and argue that it is deficient for understanding global bank regulation.  
Convergence theory measures the phenomenon along a scale shaped by a linear understanding of 
both markets and institutions, where markets are understood to be expansionary, ‘disembedding’ 
logic and institutions are viewed as instruments aimed at ‘(re-)embedding’ the market and 
subordinating it to social and political purposes.30 The school argues that state frameworks and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Holzinger, K., Knill, C., & Sommerer, T. (2008 Fall). Environmental Policy Convergence: the Impact of International Harmonization, 
Transnational Communication, and Regulatory Competition. International Organization , 62 (4), pp. 553-587: 556 
27 Knill, C. (2007 October). Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory Factors. Journal of 
European Public Policy , 12 (5), pp. 764-774: 769 
28 Bennett (1991): 219 
29 See for example Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington D.C., United States: Institute for International Economics; 
Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 
Keohane, R. O., & Milner, H. V. (1996). Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Przeworski, 
A., & Wallerstein, M. (1988 March). Structural Dependence of the State on Capital. The American Political Science Review , 82 (1), pp. 11-29. 
30 Konings, M. (2008 October). European Finance in the American Mirror: Financial Change and the Reconfiguration of Competitiveness. 
Contemporary Politics , 14 (3), pp. 253-275: 254 
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practices of finance are converging and most accounts accredit this assimilation to the external 
pressures of global market competition.  
A different and less explored way to understand economic globalization, and furthermore global 
financial integration, is to see it as a phenomenon contingent upon interests. This perspective, 
framed by the lens of game theory, sees global convergence as happening when the interests of 
powerful actors align but not otherwise. This, the international regulatory coordination theory, 
questions the main assumptions behind the dominating theoretical perspective by proposing that 
convergence is a deliberate consequence of interstate cooperation in the same way that 
divergence is the result of interstate competition. Both of these two perspectives will be discussed 
in the following deliberation. 
3.2.1 The Structural Approach: Convergence theory 
The structural discussion typically takes as its starting point the return of free capital flows 
following the breakdown of the monetary system of Bretton Woods.31 The freedom of capital to 
flow across borders opened up the possibility for capital owners to use the threat of exit to alter 
the political regulation of economic behaviour.32 The mobility of capital in other words, shifted 
the balance of power ‘away from states and other holders of tangible and immobile assets and in 
favour of owners of more intangible and mobile assets such as financial capital’.33  As we will 
see, in reaching this conclusion convergence theory relies on two assumptions that are difficult to 
verify.34 
The theory argues that globalization leads to a convergence within policy fields that have 
traditionally been assumed to be distinctly characterized by national control; regulation of such 
policy areas as national environmental issues, health and safety issues, labour, and capital.35 
Assuming so drove many IPE scholars to envision the dominance of inter-state competition over 
domestic policy choices,36 where the demand to stay eligible on the global market would drive 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Raviv, O. (2011).  Speculating on Convergence: the Western European Finance-Led Growth Regime and the New European Periphery. 
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from Sussex Research Online website: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/: 37 
32 Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA, United States: 
Harvard University Press. 
33 Raviv (2011) 
34 Drezner, D. W. (2001). Globalization and Policy Convergence. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers:58 
35 Ibid.: 53 
36 Raviv (2011): 37 
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national governments to compete through deregulation. This competition amongst states will 
accordingly force states to regulate lower than or in line with the most liberalized states.  
In this account, the deregulation and liberalization of markets leads to a narrowing of the 
differences between countries. The most common example is the ‘race to the bottom’ where 
states compete in deregulation. It is in this narrowing of interests that students in the structural 
vein examine convergence. States are predicted to converge in the assimilation of liberalization 
policies. As financial globalization integrates the markets of states, they are drawn to 
deregulation, restricted in political autonomy and necessarily converge in regulatory policies. As 
pointed out, this conclusion is suspended on two major assumptions. 
The first assumption of the theory relates to universal state behaviour. Structural convergence 
theory is rooted partly in the theory of international trade, and partly in theories of 
interjurisdictional/intergovernmental competition.37 Using a Heckscher- Ohlin model, Frieden 
and Rogowski argue that ‘exogenous trade’ (international market access to domestic actors) will 
lead to policy preferences amongst domestic actors.38  Since capital is the most mobile factor of 
production, its owners possess the most viable threat of exit. Thus it is this sector that is most 
likely to assert control over the state’s political direction. Accepting universal state behaviour 
means that this will happen everywhere, and therefore policy is likely to converge across the 
board of states.39  
Whilst evidence of policy convergence is lacking when considering specific examples, it is easier 
to spot in terms of operational deregulation.40 This brings us to the second assumption, namely 
that states are not only willing to act in unison, but furthermore impelled to do so. According to 
the direction rooted in interjurisdictional competition, market forces will drive states to enter the 
race to the bottom as they compete for mobile capital. Presumably, actors of the global capital 
market are fully informed, and driven by a search for the highest net yield. As states integrate 
financially through the free flow of capital, they will be compelled by the desire to remain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Busch (2009) 
38 Frieden, J. A., & Rogowski, R. (1996). The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview. In R. O. 
Keohane, & H. V. Milner (Eds.), Internationalization and Domestic Politics (pp. 25-47). Cambridg, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press: 42 
39 Busch (2009): 8 
40 Dombrowski, P. (1998). Haute Finance and High Theory: Recent Scholarship on Global Financial Relations. Mershon International Studies 
Review , 42 (1), pp. 1-28: 8 
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globally competitive and converge on a best practice of neo-liberalism.41 The theory naturally 
concludes that state individualism in the implementation of financial regulation will be restricted 
by the globalized economy. 
Hence, with regards to capital mobility, structural convergence theory makes two assumptions. 
The first is that states universally respond to the demands of capital, whereas other actors are 
deemed irrelevant. The second is that no state’s market power can equal the force of global 
capital, and as such, capital rules.42 In terms of global finance, convergence can be understood to 
imply a policy of laissez-faire, a policy that was prevalent in the escalation of the crisis.43As 
major banks’ (capital owners) preferences are shaped by increasing global trade and exit threats 
are made, states should relax the grip of regulation on such deciding factors as capital reserve 
demands, risk- modelling and taking, and market discipline.*  
As the discussion around the global crisis has pointed out however, it is difficult to verify the 
second assumption, the limitation of state autonomy. With this in mind, it becomes more 
interesting to study the first assumption- that states only respond to the demands of capital. If 
markets do not dictate state behaviour, it is likely that this first assumption needs to be 
reinterpreted. Such a reinterpretation should focus on how financial policies are shaped in 
individual states to determine whether these policies represent other sectors of society. Assessing 
the interests of other actors would open the analysis to occurrences of divergence. 
3.2.2 Addressing the assumptions 
Colin Hay proposes that structural studies are too broad and should specify in order to capture the 
contingencies of convergence.44 In a separate analysis, Daniel Drezner proclaims that they lack 
the ‘capacity to explain variation in convergence outcomes’.45 The discussion tends to neglect the 
state at the same time as emphasizing continuity over change by focusing on global economic 
pressure.46 In other words, it could be construed that the perspective neglects other interest-
shaping actors than capital owners. This method cannot explain the presence of divergence. Or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Colin Hay (2004) 
42 Drezner (2001): 58 
43 Baker (2010) 
* Collectively the three pillars of banking regulation according to Basel II 
44 Hay (2004) 
45 Drezner, D. W. (2005). Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: the Different Pathways to Policy Convergence. Journal of European 
Public Policy , 12 (5), pp. 841-859: 842 
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Raviv synthesizes these findings in concluding that the central question behind convergence 
scholarship, the juxtaposition of markets with socio-political institutions, neglects the political 
and institutional proliferation of financial market relations.47 In Raviv’s view then, the study of 
convergence should take place within a study of how frameworks and institutions shape power-
relations.  
Raviv draws inspiration from the ideas of Martijn Konings in his study of strategy emulation. 
Konings’s analysis suggests that convergence is the result of purpose driven political promotion 
rather than structurally imposed conditions.48 This suggests that, rather than result in perfect 
assimilation, convergence will happen as a result of willing cooperation up to a point. Drezner 
emphasizes this perspective in his claim that deliberate convergence, or policy harmonization 
takes place only as long as it does not collide with the interests of one of the important actors.49 
3.2.3 The international regulatory coordination model 
To answer the structural theories’ lack of ‘capacity to explain variation in convergence 
outcomes’, Daniel Drezner suggests using game theory. To do this, however, we have to break 
with the continuum of disembedding markets and reembedding institutions; financial 
globalization has to be understood in terms of state interests. States practice strategic emulation, 
through which convergence is a process not characterized by institutional linkages and systemic 
rigidity but rather as the strategic acceptance or reluctance of global dynamics.50 In this view, 
financial globalization is not synonymous with an abstract, external process that confronts 
national institutions, but rather represents the competition between institutionalized norms, 
relationships and mechanisms.51 It should, as an addendum, be noted that this does not mean, as 
in the theoretical stream known as variegated capitalism,52 that state preferences are path 
dependent, but rather that they are dynamic and respond to outside factors. Financial regulation 
will in this case represent these preferences. Using the dilemma found in the following table it 
should be possible to examine the divergence of global economic governance: 
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Table 1: The coordination game53 
  State B 
  Switch to country A’s 
standards (a) 
Retain national standards 
(b) 
Retain national standards 
(a) 
Coordinate at A 
(#, # - d)  
No coordination 
(0, 0) 
State A 
Switch to country B’s 
standards (b) 
No Coordination 
(-d, -d) 
Coordinate at B 
(# - d, #) 
 
The framework turns its focus on the benefits and costs of convergence, suggesting the possible 
presence of divergence despite global market forces. The costs of convergence are understood to 
reflect the price of internal structural and systemic changes in addition to external political and 
economic pressures. Conversely, benefits relate to economic and political gains of integrated 
markets. Consequently, adjustment costs are a function of the ability of a domestic actor to use 
exit rather than voice in its reaction to global coordination.54 The greater the investment of local 
actors in the status quo, the greater the cost of exit to these actors and therefore the greater the 
power of the political voice. However, on the other hand, globalization can also increase the 
threat of exit of certain domestic sectors, and in this way, the theory recognizes the importance of 
capital owners. To sum up, globalization increases the rewards for policy coordination, but also 
affects the costs of coordination in a likewise manner, thus giving incentives for both types of 
behaviour.55 
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# = benefits from regulatory coordination 
d = adjustment costs of switching standards !
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When domestic policy changes take place, other nations respond, possibly creating a global 
dynamic for change.56 However, if this dynamic is to be successful, it is likely to need collective 
action.57 In an expanded, multi-actor version, the model reviews this possibility. If the actors 
diverge in their regulatory standards, this would further result in regulatory competition where 
leading actors would try to amass as many allies to their competing sides.58 The globalization of 
finance is, according to this view then, not best described as the confrontation between 
institutions and markets, but rather as the confrontation between different institutional models of 
finance.59 Rather than study separate actors and how they react to exogenous pressures (markets), 
this model examines whether different actors have a ‘constitutive impact on the structural 
environment in which they operate.’60 Essentially the model asserts that without great power 
concert, regulatory convergence will be incomplete and transnational attempts will be futile. 
To conceptualize this, Drezner provides a model to predict the outcome of state relations whether 
they are of high or low conflict. This model divides outcomes into four different typologies of 
regulatory coordination, where alternative iii and iv amounts to convergence and i and ii to 
divergence: 
Table 2: Typology of Regulatory Coordination61 
Divergence of interests between great powers and 
other international actors 
 High conflict Low conflict 
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This framework is useful as a supplement to the coordination game. To understand how countries 
act in regulating banks we must first understand the nature of the overarching international 
outcomes. As this model shows, the success of international governance will indicate the degree 
of inter-state conflict. It will therefore add a relevant foundation to the study of policy 
divergence. 
The model is furthermore appropriate because it has been used to explain global financial 
regulation previously.62 This previous study concerned the international forum for bank 
regulation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as one of its cases. In contrast 
to the present paper however, it reviews the committee prior the recent membership expansion. 
The analysis identified global banking regulation with the club standard typology. Such ‘clubs’ or 
smaller cooperative bargaining units (as opposed to large multinational organizations) are more 
likely to conclude in convergence due to the concord between the limited members.  
The Committee has historically been particularly limiting in its membership. Referring to this, the 
earlier study points to low conflict between states, due to the club coordination between the 
members. However, recent events, most importantly the expanded membership of the BCBS, 
denote a shift in the international governance environment that suggests a higher degree of 
conflict, or divergence, between states. This shift is important to the argument that there is 
divergence in state regulation. The typology framework will be useful in highlighting this 
development. 
3.2.3.1 Benefits to the proposed model 
The model assumes, much in the same way as the realist perspective, that understanding 
international regulation translates to understanding great power preferences and capabilities. 
These capabilities deride from the size of an actor’s internal market. However, it deviates in 
arguing that preferences originate in the domestic political economy, or the visible adjustment 
costs that occur due to regulatory cooperation.63 This allows for three propositions: first, that it is 
possible that actors rationally choose to not coordinate; second that larger market size !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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governments can influence the regulation of globalization through coercive power; and thirdly, 
that disparities in capabilities or market size among the great powers are of minimal importance- 
they cannot coerce each other.64 
Besides addressing some of the faulty assumptions of convergence theory, there are some 
benefits to this perspective that ought to be pointed out that apply specifically to this analysis. 
Most significantly, it is flexible to changes as it can develop theories regarding both policy 
process and outcomes. Therefore it is ideal for analyzing the immediate transition brought forth 
by the crisis. The financial turmoil impacted state interests, something that can be hard to 
apprehend using the limited lens of convergence theory. The international coordination model 
conceptualizes convergence as a measurable variable in terms of state interests, and is therefore 
much better suited to understanding the phenomenon. 
The discussion of benefits and costs allows the analysis to focus on the specific situation for each 
country case where actors might vary in terms of their influence. This can shine a light on 
potential country differences despite equivalent exposure to economic integration. This means 
that we can examine the effects of both exit threats and voiced opinions. We can thus evaluate 
whether states converge or diverge in a method less general than focusing mainly on market 
structures.   
Lastly its focus on great powers will allow the analysis to concentrate on a smaller number of 
state examples, yet generate broader hypotheses. This is because the model expects smaller 
powers to align themselves with those greater powers that best manage to sway them using either 
coercion or incentives to influence their cost/benefit equation. This condition could also be 
understood to be a weakness in the model; Drezner’s original study has been criticized for 
neglecting important internal differences within a great power such as the EU.65 
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4. Cases and Expectations 
4.1 Case Selection 
In choosing countries the important factor is to select cases that fit into the theoretical framework. 
As mentioned, the intended definition of globalization is in terms of state interaction rather than 
as and external force demanding state adaptation. This perspective lends itself to the principles of 
‘incorporated comparison’. Developed by Phillip McMichael, this type of comparison considers a 
‘whole’ or a governing system by analyzing its ‘parts’.66 The strength of this viewpoint is that it 
does not assume that the international system exists independent of nation states, nor that these 
factors are stagnant or path dependent units of analysis. This lets the analysis focus on state 
interests and how they influence global divergence or convergence. To capture this perspective 
and observe the way the parts, in this case countries, constitute the whole, or the global regulation 
of banks, the study will use the two-step analysis as discussed in section ‘3.1 Understanding and 
operationalizing convergence’. 
To find cases that accord with the research question and the relevant theory, there are certain 
conditions that need to be controlled for. This means that the countries must be big actors with 
anticipated international influence. Furthermore, they must be advanced economies with a 
globally integrated financial sector. In order to examine regional effects there would also have to 
be representatives of different regions. The following country cases fulfil these demands: The 
United Kingdom, Germany, USA, and Canada (although Canada is in this case by far the less 
influential member, it is included nonetheless to provide a more complete explanation of North 
American banking to add to the regional dimension of the analysis). 
The countries chosen can for the purposes of this analysis be considered equal in integration with 
the global economy. They are all functioning democracies that use an open capitalist approach to 
organize their economic activity. All four countries are members of the group of 20 (and the 
previous group of 8), and as such leading actors in the global economy. Thus we can control for 
the influence of economic integration. As an additional aspect, they represent two different 
regions, North America and Europe. This major difference, along with other discoveries will be 
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considered in the discussion of how the representatives choose to interact, be it through 
competition or coordination. 
As conventional cases in convergence study analyses, Germany and UK are leading members of 
the EU on separate sides of the monetary union. This makes them interesting as they represent 
similar interests through their EU membership, but differ in financial policy as suggested by their 
position on the monetary union. It will be important to take into account the influence of the EU 
in forming national policies. Both countries also represent two sides of the varieties of capitalism 
school, Germany as a representative of the coordinated market economies (CMEs) and the UK as 
the prime example of a liberal market economy (LME).67   
Canada and the US are both members of NAFTA and representatives of the North American 
region. The US holds considerable sway over its northern neighbour, but Canada is known as a 
sound economic actor with considerable normative influence. Furthermore, the crisis has affected 
Canada less severely, indicating that it should be influential in the financial restructuring. It 
should also be interesting to compare North American coordination to that of its transatlantic 
competitor the EU. 
One concern with using Canada and the US is that they are both examples traditionally included 
in the LME group and both are considered Anglo-American type economies. As we will discover 
however, they differ significantly in their approach to banking regulation in a way that suggests 
that general categorization does not give a complete picture. For example, Canadian banking 
regulation is highly concentrated, more prudent, and generally more successful as compared to 
regulation in the US. Although developed from liberal self-regulation, Canada’s banking 
regulation is evidently an outlier in terms of the amount of coordination that its LME label would 
predict. As a result, Canada’s position has arguably not been weakened along with that of the US 
and UK and the disillusionment with Anglo-American liberalism. 
Using the two-step design in assessing these countries involves the following procedure. The first 
step draws on Bennet’s policy categories to identify the actors and institutions that are included in 
the formation of state preferences. The second step assesses these preferences in terms of state 
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power and how they are reflected in inter-state interaction.68  This method couples well with the 
theoretical framework, as its strength is a flexible approach to multiple influencing variables.  A 
weakness of the method will be, as in any qualitative assessment of convergence, the difficulty in 
generalizing the findings. However, the aim of the study is to point at recent developments rather 
than provide definitive answers, as it is too close in temporal proximity for such conclusions 
anyways.  
4.2 Expectations 
Using these cases, this study will test the assumption that there has been convergence in global 
bank regulation. According to the proposed framework, there are two major indicators we would 
have to observe to do so, the coordination of global governance and state policy interests. The 
coordination of global governance, in light of regulatory typologies, would indicate the presence 
of convergence or divergence by pointing to the level of conflict. The individual policy interests 
of states can then be used to assess state similarities and differences. To observe, as this study 
hypothesises, divergence in bank regulation we should find conflict at the international 
governance level as well as differences in the specific policy factors. 
Firstly, to gain an understanding of convergence through coordination at the international level 
the analysis will examine the BCBS. To see policy divergence, the model would predict a 
paradigm shift in the Committee’s modus operandi. The first accord suggests a high degree of 
club coordination. However, with its increased membership it appears that Basel no longer 
automates such confined coordination of international standards. This would suggest that, 
depending on the degree of conflict, the inter-state coordination of bank regulation is evolving 
towards one of the three other typologies, sham standards, rival standards, or harmonized 
standards. This points out that the relationship between states is also changing, and could indicate 
divergence in policies. 
The breakup of club standards would suggest an increased opportunity for state competition, 
which would be observed through a variety in banking regulation between the chosen cases. As 
mentioned, the regulation of banking is a highly technical field that relies on detailed definitions 
of specific requirements. In measurable terms, there should therefore be variety in the policy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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goals, instruments, and contents related to capital requirements, liquidity minimums, leverage 
standards, and credit rating of the four observed cases. These factors are chosen based on the 
findings in ‘"$!4CDEFC!GHIJFKFC1! ,LMNMN! FOP!HDQJL! NIMRSN’ that show their importance to bank 
regulation policies. Whether policy differences are pronounced would depend on inter-state 
relationships. Thus they would be more distinct in some cases than others. If, on the other hand, 
we observe that states are willing to recognize and accommodate policy changes that reflect the 
interests of other states we would have to question the hypothesis. 
The financial foundation of the US has been shaken and therefore we should see a decline in the 
stability of this leadership role. One possible way this could be reflected is in Washington’s 
ability to dictate Basel negotiations and the policies of other nations. Furthermore, to observe 
divergence, we would expect the US to have the most recognizable and autonomous model due to 
its market size. This would be reflected in policies highly connected with the policy goals for its 
banking sector. However, in previous events, the US has been successful in promoting its policy 
goals at the international level. If this was to repeat itself it could indicate that states will not 
diverge, and lead to concerns with the hypothesis. 
Canada, as the lesser regional power would not openly challenge the policies of its neighbour at 
the international stage. However, if there were regulatory divergence, Ottawa would be expected 
to ensure the possibility of maintaining its individual supervisory model. This is particularly due 
to the stability of its preferred model as seen through Canada evading most of the severities 
brought on by the crisis in other countries. This being said, because of its market size, Canada is 
the case most susceptible to coercion from other states. We could therefore observe this in the 
form of convergence if Canada was unsuccessful in protecting its policy autonomy. 
The GFC has likely altered the ratio of costs to benefits, and in the case of the US and the UK, 
leveraged in favour of the benefits to changing the status quo due to the failure of the Anglo-
American financial model. We should therefore see this have an effect on the global stage, 
particularly concerning the smaller power, the UK. This would indicate a significantly decreased 
role of the UK, perhaps also so within the EU. If the relationship between costs and benefits is 
sufficiently influenced to support it, we could see cooperation within the EU that would be 
substantial enough to challenge the US. This would depend on the differences between 
particularly the UK and Germany. The decreasing role of the US should generate an incentive for 
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EU cooperation and a regional convergence between the two European actors that would indicate 
a global divergence between the Union and the US. 
5. Data 
5.1 Basel 
The following section will discuss the role of the Basel Committee in coordinating the 
international reform. After discussing the specific responsibilities and purposes of the BCBS, and 
furthermore, the negotiation process, the section will conclude that there has been a decisive shift 
in the Committee’s relevance that indicates a higher degree of conflict between states. This 
finding will be a useful supplement to the discussion of policy aspects in the next section. 
One possible way for regulators to stagnate the impetus to compete through financial 
deregulation is to coordinate internationally.69 Individually, as pointed out by proponents of 
convergence theory, domestic regulators are trapped in a prisoners dilemma: ‘if they impose 
regulatory costs on financial firms that other countries fail to impose, they make their institutions 
less competitive in the world marketplace.’70 Ethan Kapstein refers to this particular example as 
the regulator’s dilemma.71  
Drezner suggests that in the face of opposition, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, like-minded states 
will attempt to form club IGOs (see table 2 in section ‘#$"$#! &IJ! MOSJLOFSMDOFC! LJWGCFSDLY!UDDLPMOFSMDO!ZDPJC’). These intergovernmental organizations have membership requirements 
that exclude or limit the participation of dissenting countries, essentially forming a club for like-
minded countries. In mediating the regulator’s dilemma of global banking, the group of economic 
powers (Gs) has previously successfully collaborated through the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS). A part of the presumption that there is convergence in global banking is the 
finding that the BCBS has in these cases been an especially good example of such a club.72 In the 
midst of the recent crisis, states again turned to Basel to attempt to coordinate the regulatory 
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reform. Therefore the agreement will in this case be a way to conceptualize model for "-
convergence.  
All three rounds of Basel negotiations have occurred somewhat related to financial crises, 
including the latest third round. The initial agreement established two noteworthy trends of 
banking regulation; capital reserve requirements as the most important feature of regulation, and 
a shift away from regulatory systems to supervisory systems of Bank oversight.73 The second 
round continued the focus on the first regulatory pillar, capital reserves, but relinquished the 
power to set requirements to the banks themselves through the ‘advanced internal ratings-based’ 
(A-IRB) approach.74 Furthermore, the second round established two other pillars of international 
bank regulation: risk- modelling and market discipline.75 The recent third round reemphasized the 
focus on capital reserve requirements, but also introduced an innovative focus on countercyclical 
incentives.76 
The third, most recent, attempt to coordinate through Basel was announced on 12 September 
2010, and approved by the G-20 on 12 November the same year.77 The revisions introduce new 
definitions of capital composition and quantity, capital conservation buffers, countercyclical 
buffers, leverage ratio, and liquidity standards.78 The implementation of these standards will 
adhere to very different timing, with capital requirement standards coming into play in early 2013 
and other indicators from 2018 and onwards.79 This will have its implications for the effect of 
Basel, particularly in Europe where banks are faced with severe capital restraints. 
The main policy trends of Basel III are stricter capital reserve requirements* and new standards 
for liquidity and leverage.** Its purpose is to address Committee findings that banks had, under 
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the previous Basel II regime, excessive freedom to decrease their equity to perilous levels.80 It 
needs to be added, however, that the new requirements were not overhauled to be systemically 
different from Basel II; note for instance, as one of the major criticisms of Basel points out, that 
for institutions such as those deemed ‘too big to fail’, new capital requirements are no higher than 
those reserves reported right before these institutions failed.81 Hellwig finds that the committee 
was unwilling to move outside its traditional framework or consider any ‘thorough overhaul’.82 
Essentially, the accord looks to continue the focus on individual bank stability rather than a 
system-wide approach,83 and arguably it missed any meaningful use of the policy window the 
crisis provided.84 To conclude, as Financial Times analyst Martin Wolf finds, ‘…the mountain of 
Basel has laboured mightily and brought forth a mouse.’85 The committee has not been successful 
in addressing the more pertinent and contentious issues that are more systemic in nature. 
5.1.1 Club negotiation 
Why should an analysis of state policy preferences consider Basel? These accords do not merely 
come as a result of tug-o-war between regulators and the banking sector but rather highlight how 
internal interests do influence how states behave. The following discussion will underline the 
importance of such interests. The way that states act at the international arena indicates 
divergence in a way that convergence theory fails to address. As seen below, the account will 
bring the discussion back to the more important actors as discussed in the theoretical framework, 
namely states. 
In discussing the negotiation process of Basel, the paper will only touch on the first and third 
round. This is not only for the sake of brevity, but also more importantly because they make the 
most ample comparison in terms of circumstances. Both cases emerged out of financial crises that 
seriously damaged the bargaining leverage of the US. Obviously the second negotiation round 
was influential to the Committee’s evolution, however this evolution is more noticeable when !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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presented through the contrasting narratives of the first and third round. Not discussing the details 
of the second round allows the account to better highlight the shifting role of the BCBS. 
5.1.1.1 Basel I 
Reports from the first Basel accord point to a confining club-like organization dominated by the 
US and the UK. This account is included because it indicates a strong role for state cooperation 
and coercion that contrasts today’s situation. 
Particularly one incident, the 1980s debt crisis, had an important say in the momentum of this 
process. Much like the recent crisis, it exposed insufficiencies in the US banking system that led 
the United States to champion ‘functionally equivalent’ regulation of banking.86 These worries, in 
addition to concerns that multilateral efforts through the BCBS were moving too slow, led the 
Federal Reserve Board to move unilaterally by proposing an upgraded capital adequacy regime.87 
However, the failure of the US regulatory system left it in a weak position to enforce a general 
adoption of its model.88 This moved the US to seek out a ‘coalition of the willing,’ to which the 
UK responded.89 In addressing the weaknesses in the regulatory system, Congress emulated new 
methods from particularly Britain, likely leading the two countries closer together in terms of 
regulatory similarities.90 Britain, on the other hand was going through an internal struggle 
between its financial institutions and bank system reformers.91 Actually, the interest of both 
countries converged in several important ways, something that was crucial to this cooperation.92 
Seeing the win-win opportunity in cooperation, the willing coalition quickly penned down a 
bilateral agreement on banking regulation in 1987.93 
It was indeed this bilateral agreement that injected the necessary fuel to the multilateral 
discussions at Basel.94 Charles Goodhart describes the agreement as a ‘powerplay’ from the two 
main financial centres that pressured the other BCBS members into subscribing to the idea of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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coordinated banking regulation.95 The alliance put pressure on the Japanese to cooperate with the 
US and on the European side, stifled the French and German attempt at promoting a European 
Commission agreement.96 Although there are other possible factors involved it is quite clear from 
the records that the alliance between the US and the UK was a driving force in framing standards 
for bank regulation through the first Basel Accord. 
5.1.1.2 Basel III 
The previous discussion of the first accord gives ample reasons for comparison to the most recent 
Basel round, particularly because the impetus for political involvement in both cases generated 
from an international banking crisis that had a severe effect on the US. However, there is one 
major difference between the first accord and the recent agreement, namely membership. 
Originally with membership limited to the G10 (exceptions given to Luxemburg and Spain), the 
Committee now comprises an expanded and diverse compound of all the members of the G20. 
Arguably, the BCBS has evolved from a club IGO to one of increased heterogeneity. This means 
that the threat of smaller powers amassing an opposition to the Committee’s great members has 
increased, and thus the possibility of club coordination has decreased. This undoubtedly has an 
impact on the influence of the BCBS. 
Speaking on the international regulatory agenda, Pagliari argues that the US, as a proponent of 
neoliberal ideas, continued to play an important role in the Committee, and that the crisis has not 
diminished its role notably.97 Pagliari’s discussion claims that any non-US (particularly 
European) impact on financial regulation would most likely be at the regional level because of 
this.98 This is further reflected in a press statement made by the European Parliament, where the 
implementation rather than negotiation process of Basel is emphasized.99 What this indicates is 
not a regulatory capture by the US, but instead the decreasing influence of Basel where there is 
more internal conflict and less pressure on standard compliance. 
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Although US regulators have maintained a leading position at the transnational level through the 
Basel negotiation process,100 their role has not been reflected through national acceptance and 
implementation.101 Arguably the negotiation of the third accord has been marred by the previous 
withdrawal of US support for Basel II. In the most recent process, the US has again decisively 
turned to internal solutions. Conversely, the EU, which was instrumental in Basel II 
implementation,102 is looking to coordinate with the help of Basel. In fact, the EU arguably stands 
the most to gain from global governance as it can provide a confine to structure the coordination 
of its members. The contrast between these two powers is a source of transatlantic tension.  
The previous withdrawal of the US from Basel II has likely been detrimental to the most recent 
agreement.103 The US disregard for the Committee’s decisions conflicts with that of the other 
examples because the Committee is much more relevant to the EU in coordinating regional 
efforts and also to Canada as a venue for normative power. This has mostly affected US- EU 
relations. It can be argued that the conflict of relevance has caused a divergence between the US 
and the EU.104 This is particularly due to the uncertainty regarding room for Basel 
implementation in the new US regulatory structure,105 which demonstrates the continued intent 
by Washington to reserve itself from committing to the Committee’s agreements. The split 
between the two influential actors is conceivably an important reason why the third round has 
been so reluctant to address the more contentious issues.  
Although Canada is one of the original Committee members, the literature speaks little on its 
influence in these negotiations. Likely, Canada’s involvement is hampered by the restraints it 
faces in openly challenging the US.106 To understand Canada’s role it is necessary to understand 
its internal focus. It is in Canada’s interest to have as much policy autonomy as possible in order 
to allow it to continue its prudent and successful regulatory policies without being restricted, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Herring, R. J. (2007). The Rocky Road to Implementation of Basel II in the United States. Atlantic Economic Journal , 35 (4), pp. 411-429: 
411 
101 Ibid.: 412 
102 Veron, N. (2012). Financial Reform After the Crisis: An Early Assessment (Working Paper No. 12). Retrieved from Peterson Institute for 
International Economics website: http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp12-2.pdf: 4 
103 Atlantic Council. (2010 October). The Danger of Divergence: TRansatlantic Cooperation on Financial Reform. Retrieved 2011 8-November 
from Atlantic Council: http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/ACUS_TR_Danger_Divergence_Report.pdf: 19 
104 Delahaye, B.P. (2011). Basel III: Capital Adequacy and Liquidity After the Financial Crisis (Short Paper). Retrieved from Harward Law 
website: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/llm/select-papers-from-the-seminar-in-international-finance/llm-papers-2010-
2011/delahaye.pdf: 3 
105 Ibid.: 18 
106 Leblond, P. (2010-2011). Canada, the European Union, and Transatlantic Financial Governance. International Journal , 66 (1), pp. 57-72: 71 
!#B!
particularly by its neighbour. This makes Basel an important forum for gathering normative 
support for this preference. 
The negotiation process of Basel III has already revealed deep-seated disagreements betweens its 
participants. This is emphasized by the individual action taken by several states in framing 
legislative initiatives even before the finalization of Basel III.107 The focus on individual models 
has probably induced the previously mentioned reluctance to approach contentious systemic 
issues and rather emphasize elaborate technical solutions.108 This variance in models is not 
consistent with the club typology, and it is clear that there has been a shift in the Basel regime. 
Due to this fragmented response, this latest effort has produced less relevant standards that only 
give the appearance of global coordination, standards that fall into the sham typology (see table 2 
in section ‘#$"$#! &IJ! MOSJLOFSMDOFC! LJWGCFSDLY! UDDLPMOFSMDO! ZDPJC’). It appears that the 
expanded membership of Basel has led to a more heterogeneous Committee where members are 
vary of delegating their decision making power. According to the typologies this should lead to a 
higher degree of inter-state conflict, in other words divergence. 
5.2 Country Cases 
The following section will examine the details of the policy goals, content, instruments, outcomes 
and styles of each case. Identifying these is the first step to the two-step analysis. They will later 
be compared, as part of the second step, in the analysis section. The aim of this detailed 
discussion is to create an inclusive picture of the status quo preferences of each country through 
examining, as Colin Bennett suggests, the different aspects of policy. As argued in this paper, the 
policies of these countries are noticeably divergent. The evidence of this will first be presented in 
this section, and then discussed in the following section, chapter ‘<$!-OFCYNMN’. 
The intention of chapter 5.2 is to present a detailed description of the empirical evidence in an 
organized fashion. The actual in depth analysis of this evidence will first be begun in the next 
chapter. The purpose behind this is to handle the presentation of the evidence as comprehensible 
as possible. 
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It should also be noted that besides being guided by the policy categories presented in Bennett’s 
study, this scope has also been limited on concerning which specific policy content to assess. 
This focus is based on the categories which have dominated the discussion of bank regulation and 
that have already been noted in section ‘"$! 4CDEFC! GHIJFKFC1! ,LMNMN! FOP! HDQJL! NIMRSN’ and 
section ‘:$%!;FNJC’, namely capital requirements, liquidity, leverage, and credit rating. The fact 
that the discussion has been restricted in this way might be considered evidence of convergence, 
however, as both the discussion on Basel as well as the following data indicates, countries have 
noticeably different ways of framing these categories.  
5.2.1 The Financial crisis 
The presentation will start with an outline of the major impacts of the financial crisis on each 
country case. The various ways the different countries were affected by the crisis is interesting to 
the discussion of policy convergence. Identifying which sectors were the most affected could 
provide insight to the nature of finance in each case, but also more importantly give an idea of 
shifts in country preferences that would be important to understanding their individual interests. 
We can use these crisis outcomes to help identify whether the subsequent responses have targeted 
the specific demands of individual countries or reflected a general convergent reform process. 
This will in turn be supporting evidence in whether or not there has been divergence. Essentially 
this section is trying to locate the keys to understanding the specific interests relevant to each 
case. 
5.2.1.1 The United States 
The US was essentially the epicentre of the first stage of the subprime crisis. The burdens of its 
costs suggest that the US could eye the benefits of change in its reform efforts. Amongst the 
factors leading to the crisis, many analysts point to three decades of steady deregulation in the US 
banking system. This reliance on market-making ideals helped promote financial innovation that 
resulted in the different investment vehicles so well documented in the aftermath. These 
instruments of financial innovation caused regulators and Wall Street insiders both to concede 
that “this time it’s different”.109 A short account of the crisis shows that a large number of 
financial institutions managed to shift risks by ‘exploiting loopholes in order to take an 
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undercapitalized highly leveraged one-way bet on the economy’.110 A main reason this wager 
was possible was the breakdown of the Glass-Steagall Act, the legislation separating commercial 
from investment banks.111 These regulatory failures collectively give incentives to fix a broken 
system. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (henceforth DFA) is the one 
prominent and lengthy* piece of regulative legislation that has been passed by the federal 
government in response to the financial collapse.112 The Economist has described it as a 
suffocating ever-growing hydra of regulation,113 and in many aspects it does represent a reversal 
of previous deregulation, including an appeal to again separate commercial and investment 
banks. On the other hand, the Act, in its inconclusiveness, can also be argued to compliment the 
established laissez-faire approach of the Obama administration.114 
Broadly speaking, the post-crisis setting has found US banks in a better position in terms of 
capital adequacy contra their European counterparts. In terms of liquidity, however, the situation 
is slightly more problematic. The identified failures of the US financial system give the US a 
strong incentive for reform. These factors have obviously affected the international negotiations 
of common regulatory standards.115 
5.2.1.2 Canada 
In many ways, Canada emerged out of the ‘07/’08 crisis as the epitome of well managed banking, 
with little incentive to change. As in the great depression, none of its banks failed, and no 
bailouts were doled out.116 The major way that the crisis impacted Canada was through a collapse 
in the short-term loan (asset- backed commercial paper) market,117 and as such the only 
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government action necessary was to interfere as the lender of last resort.118 In the end, no major 
legislation was passed in response to the crisis, as no major flaws to the Canadian system seemed 
to be exposed.  
Economists point to innate Canadian conservatism, and maybe more importantly to superior 
Canadian regulation as reasons for the country’s success.119 In terms of post-crisis negotiations, 
this put Canada in an, at least ideologically, superior position compared to the other cases 
considered here. Financial downturn in the US and Europe has provided Canada not only with a 
moral soapbox, but furthermore also led to the expansion of Canadian financial institutions 
abroad, filling some of the voids of these countries’ struggling financial markets.120 To conclude 
the crisis did not lead to any remarkable changes to Ottawa’s policy preferences. 
5.2.1.3 The EU 
When considering Germany and the UK it is first imperative to understand the surrounding 
framework of bank regulation in the EU. The bargaining block that the union forms is an 
important aspect of the analysis and it is therefore necessary to examine the coherence of its 
framework and guiding principles with the policies of the two countries. It is, as referred to in the 
theoretical background, important to understand that the EU cannot be treated as a static unitary 
actor. Therefore this discussion of the EU is complemented with the subsequent discussions of 
two of its most important members. 
The struggle between national autonomy and international markets and supervision is a major 
roadblock to the integration of financial regulation in the EU.121 Therefore, the convergence or 
harmonization of the European banking systems has been a cornerstone in the effort towards the 
single financial market.122 However, as opposed to the oft resorted to example of trade policy, 
finance policy has remained mainly in the national domain. This means that national authorities 
are more important drivers of policy in the case of finance.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The EU has relied upon two main principles, decentralization and cooperation, based on hopes 
that coordination through committees and information exchange would promote integration.123 
Rather than to work towards a transfer of competence and authority to the EU level, the tactic has 
revolved around cooperative decentralization, with the hope that committees and information 
sharing procedures would lead to a better-integrated system.124 This means that the main tools 
and responsibility for crisis management lies with national authorities rather than a collective EU 
institution.125 Thus with the intensification of internationalization of EU banks there was no 
concomitant consecration of EU authority to regulate this.  
It is not surprising that the EU was considerably ill prepared architecturally for the GFC. The 
crisis necessitated state action by demanding responses to the exposed fault lines in the regulation 
of global finance.126 For Europe the major fault line was an inability to coordinate across borders, 
prompting two possible responses: ‘beggar-thy-neighbour solutions’, or enhanced, pragmatic 
European cooperation.127 Simply stated, the systemic, cross-border nature of the crisis defied the 
structures of the Union. Two main concerns were thus confirmed; that surrounding the ability to 
manage liquidity without a lender-of-last-resort, and that on solvency and the arrangement for 
resolving cross-border banking crises.128 These deficiencies have in recent times developed into a 
blooming bank crisis that threatens to engulf all of Europe and cause many to fear the destruction 
of the monetary union. 
To conclude, the GFC has acted as a catalyst for change by exposing some of the more costly 
aspects of the current EU structure. Furthermore, with the dominating ideology in mind, the crisis 
has triggered a ‘cumulative backlash’ reaction to the failed Anglo-American experiment.129 The 
global impact of this reaction has been increased by the expanded capacity of the EU due to its 
economic relevance.130 To understand the viability of a common EU reaction it is first pertinent 
to examine its leading members. 
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5.2.1.4 The UK* 
Due to the nature of the British financial system, it was another epicentre of the GFC, initializing 
the breakout of the European facet of the crisis. This has given the UK perhaps the biggest 
incentive for change between it and Germany. Its government was forced to announce an $850 
billion stimulus package.131 The British economy relies on its financial centre in London as its 
primary engine and any halt to its functions would be critical. Therefore the crisis, with its 
consequent disillusionment with the British regulatory model caused an internal re-evaluation 
within the UK policy-making elite.132 
British banking regulation policy has therefore been decisively impacted by the financial 
collapse. The crisis has put financial regulation back on the political agenda. First with the bank 
run on Northern Rock in 2007, but later and more importantly with the evolution into the 
systemic crisis of October 2008. This development ‘widened the range of regulatory issues now 
commanding the attention of elected politicians, bringing the issue of the macro-stability of the 
whole banking system to public attention.133 This gave British regulators a pronounced incentive 
to a more system wide reform than for example Germany. 
The years following the GFC have seen several substantial changes to the British banking system, 
but how do these relate to the political reliance on market forces? One trend stands out; the 
political demand for prudential regulation. For instance, former Prime Minister Brown publicly 
recognized the importance of the role of government as a result of the crisis.134 Noticeably, the 
major proponents of this trend do, unlike Mr. Brown, appear to be outside of the formal spheres 
of influence. For example, former chairman of the British Financial Services Authority (FSA), 
Lord Turner has been a vocal spokesperson for prudential regulation and topping the Basel 
recommendations.135 These interests have shaped the British reform process. 
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5.2.1.5 Germany 
As an export oriented economy, Germany was among the most affected countries (in terms of 
GDP decline) of the Global crisis.136 Due to an increasing internationalization of assets (globally, 
not just within the EU region),137 Germany’s banking sector was also exposed. Therefore, 
Germany’s financial system was quite substantially impacted by the crisis. In fact, around a 
quarter of Europe’s write-downs were made by German banks.138 One study shows that it was 
particularly the publicly owned parts of the sector that was hit by the GFC.139  
Germany successfully managed to stave off a full-blown bank crisis by implementing system 
wide government guarantees and fiscal stimulus packages.140 Despite the threat to its banking 
sector however, Germany has not championed many individual reforms following the crisis. 
Most of its efforts, as will become clear further on, have focused on influencing global and 
regional agreements. The decision to focus on the international level is likely influenced by 
Germany’s dependence on a risk exposed bank system, which has little sway over global trends. 
However it is exacerbated by the corporatist nature of banking institutions that appear 
constrictive to Germany’s domestic policy choices. Look for Germany’s policies to be impacted 
by this constriction. 
5.2.1.6 Findings 
Evidently there are some major differences in the way that the GFC affected each of our four 
examples. This has, as pointed out, shaped their reform demands in the post-crisis rebuilding 
process. According to the theoretical framework, these demands should be reflected in each 
country’s policy interests. To observe divergence, we would need to see such policy interests 
codified into individual reform models rather than observe a strong consensus that reflect one 
country or model’s particular interests. The following sections will take a closer look at whether 
this has occurred.  
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5.2.2 The banking sectors 
The following segment will aim to outline the policy style and subsequently the goals of each 
country example. The different countries practice different economic policies that rely on a 
variety of financing structures. The most apparent differences lie between the UK and the US on 
one side and Germany on the other, with the Canadian system somewhere in-between. The UK 
and US boast a tradition of lightly regulated yet highly complex financial activity, whereas 
authorities in Germany and Canada have taken a more involved stance. This section will further 
supplement the previous findings of different country interests.  
5.2.2.1 The US 
Of the country cases reviewed here, banks may be the least important to the financing structure of 
the US. The US banking sector is highly fragmented both in regulation and in structure. There are 
a vast number of financial institutions both at the state and federal levels- a commercial bank can 
operate under either a national bank charter or a state bank charter.141 This makes the banking 
sector a comparably large one. It also creates a necessity for distinctions between federal and 
state governance. Over the course of recent decades, these legal separations of federal and state 
governed banks have diminished and the system is today well integrated thanks to legislation 
allowing for extensive nationwide mergers.142 Nevertheless, there remains a ‘multiplicity of 
banking regulators and a resulting dispersion of authority’ in the sector.143 
The sector is further differentiated from the other cases by the previous separation of commercial 
and investment banks by the Glass-Steagall Act. Rather than allow universal banking, the US 
system developed into two separate financial services industries.144 This separation was repealed 
by a process of deregulation ending in 1999, opening for a system that until now has remained 
more or less universal.145 As a result of this evolution through separation, financial institutions 
have had to rely on their creativity and innovation to access especially the mortgage market. 
As mentioned, the oversight of US banks has over recent decades, and through several 
administrations, been contained by a political culture promoting deregulation. Notwithstanding, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the American banking system is decidedly characterized by government involvement. For 
instance, it was the Roosevelt administration that established the government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (more commonly referred 
to as Fannie Mae), a decision that essentially created a secondary mortgage market.146 Private 
financial institutions exploited this market through the use of innovative mortgage-backed 
securities (mortgages made into tradable assets). 
One of the GSEs, the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) played a founding 
role in the establishment of the securitized mortgages market by being a trade vehicle exempt 
from legal, regulatory and tax issues that prohibited the private sector.147 Freddie Mac and other 
GSEs established the governmental arm in what was to become a parallel ‘shadow banking’* 
system.148 Through deregulation this market was increasingly privatized, and finally with the 
dissolution of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999, it changed from a ‘buy and hold’ to a ‘buy to trade' 
market.149 The drive to create more tradable assets led to the eventual lending boom and 
‘subprime’ mortgages which were furthermore supported by the GSEs.** In this way, government 
involvement in the banking sector had created a false market that arguably deserves its share of 
the blame for the GFC. 
This link between the public and private sectors has continued to be important both through and 
after the crisis. Consider, as an example, the inherent guarantees attached to the Federal 
government’s ‘too big to fail’ bailout policy. On the other hand, one aspect of the banking sector 
that has (to an extent) changed is the categorization of regulatory authority based on legal naming 
rather than function. It was this categorization that allowed parallel mortgage markets to exist, as 
institutions were able to function outside of the authority of banking regulating agencies through 
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name only. The DFA has changed this by providing authority for ‘clear, strong and consolidated 
supervision of … any financial firm- regardless of legal form…’150 
As a final note on the US banking sector, it should be mentioned that Basel II has yet to be 
implemented by many of its members. On one hand this could imply that banks will be more 
affected by the simultaneous attempt to transition to both Basel II and III.151 On the other hand it 
could also imply that Basel III will be disregarded much in the same way that its predecessor has 
been treated. The fragmented nature of the US banking sector points to a diverging national 
preference that should affect the policies Washington pursues. This will be further discussed in 
section ‘:$"$#!8FMO!*JWGCFSDLY!;DPMJN!FOP!.JWMNCFSMDO’. 
5.2.2.2 Canada 
Canada has traditionally relied on a bank dominated financing structure, however market-based 
financing has increased in importance in the run-up to the GFC.152 As compared with the US, 
Canada hosts a relatively simple banking system. Its banking sector is distinguished the 
domination of six large banks* with an integrated nationwide branch network.153 This network is 
furthermore exposed to limited external competition, which leads to the other characteristic of the 
sector, namely the reduced incentives to take risks.154 This structure has evolved due to the 
Canadian federal government relying on the major banks to cooperatively regulate themselves. 
The resulting importance of these six major institutions has led to a regulatory scheme targeted at 
managing these major banks, particularly in terms of market influence.155 
With regards to the international stage of financial governance, Canada has traditionally looked 
towards the US, and furthermore acted as a broker between its neighbour and Europe.156 The 
Canadian method of regulation is characterized by prudential concerns, not only with the health !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the major banks, but furthermore with depositor protection.157 Therefore, Canadian 
requirements often impose higher capital standards and lower leverage values than seen in other 
cases.158 Also, Canada has not adopted the concept of universal banking, in effect separating 
between banking, insurance, and securities dealing sectors.159 The freedom to do so is promoted 
by the reduced competition and risk taking in the banking sector. According to its policy 
preferences, Canada should look to protect its status quo in order to maintain these inherent 
values. 
A final note on the structure of the banking sector and its subsequent regulation regards the 
political tectonics of Canada. Whilst regulatory oversight of financial institutions lies at the 
federal level, provinces often compete amongst each other in attracting investment. In recent 
years this has led to a situation in which the Canadian Bankers Association (CBA) has voiced its 
concern over provincial governments encroaching on federal duties by attempting to stake out 
individual bank regulatory schemes.160 The CBA notes this fragmentation as a concern to be 
taken seriously in upcoming federal discussions on financial market regulation.161 
5.2.2.3 The EU 
The EU’s financing structure is heavily reliant on bank lending; a situation that reflects German 
preferences more than it does the UK’s. Although the integration of finances (particularly 
banking) has been held as a pertinent goal by EU policy-makers since the emergence of the single 
market, this achievement has been slow to be obtained.162 Schoenmaker and van Laecke find that 
only in recent years has the ‘long expected’ cross-border merger wave in Europe started.163 
Contrasted with banking sectors in other continents, however, European banks are significantly 
more internationalized, primarily due to their cross-border activity within the EU.164  
The EU has established somewhat of a precedence of incorporating Basel recommendations into 
regional legislation through the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), a two-part legislative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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piece.* The CRD achieves longevity through a process of amendments to update its relevance and 
is due to be implemented in 2012. In fact, EU authorities have also attempted to use the GFC as a 
policy driver for increasing financial supervision.165 However, it seems the EU has thus far held 
back on reforms to its banking regulatory scheme. It appears to have neglected key regulatory 
flaws, focusing rather on the securities sector.166  
The European bank sector has one more significant common factor, namely the high level of 
financialization, or the exposure to risk. This was among the principal causes of the severity of 
the financial crisis in the EU.167 This same problem has also limited both the UK and Germany in 
their regulatory response to the crisis.168 Germany and the UK are traditional antipodes that 
continually find themselves at opposite ends of negotiations within the Union. In their financial 
framework, Germany has typically been reliant on state guidance, whereas Britain is seen as 
having the weakest state involvement.169 Furthermore, EU members have (since the second half 
of the 1980s) converged around the German- type universal banking model.170 Britain and 
Germany diverge in their acceptance of universal banking, with Britain being the reluctant one.** 
To recapitulate this process, regulatory harmonization has most likely led to a EU framework 
with a lower regulatory threshold for the purpose of accommodating all its members.171 
5.2.2.4 The UK 
Hodson and Mabbett argue in agreement with Peter Hall that the financial regulatory system of 
Britain has developed within a distinct paradigm.172 Accordingly, this paradigm directs British 
policy decisions through a distinct path that differs from paths found in other countries. This path 
can be described as ‘market-making’, a policy path that emphasizes the regulatory approaches of 
competition and market efficiency.173 One important characteristic of the British paradigm is an 
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inherent paradox: Although British authorities have become known for taking a distanced stance 
in regulating the financial market, the political structure is also characterized by a comparative 
ease in implementing fundamental reforms.174  
Britain’s financing system revolves around the trading centre referred to as ‘the City’. This 
geographically concentrated political powerhouse binds and shapes much of the financial 
political decisions in the UK.175 However, the British market- based system does not overpower 
the UK’s reliance on banks, and in terms of financing, one can claim that the UK is equally 
market-based and bank- based. Politically speaking, however, the financial centre dominates. 
British promotion of deregulation can be understood as a reaction to City demands and economic 
patriotism.176 The relationship between the City and regulators has historically been highly 
informal, and continues to be so even under a more formalized set of rules.177  
The ruling British ideology has stressed the importance of self-regulation or in the worst case, 
cooperative regulation without adversarial confrontation.178 The preferred method of policy 
evolution has in this sense been more reactive than anticipatory,179 meaning that regulation has 
developed as a response to crises rather than as a form of prevention. Froud claims that this 
method excludes ‘democratic forces’ from the government of financial markets except for in the 
few instances of financial turmoil.180 
As seen in the discussion of the financial crisis, its effects have opened another window of 
opportunity for politicizing the regulation of Britain’s financial market. The principal policies 
that govern the British banking sector are being updated with the reform of some of the important 
regulatory bodies that are due to be implemented in 2013.181 As the Financial Policy Committee 
(FPC) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) is replacing the current Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) there will also be an expected switch from principles-based regulation to a focus 
on outcomes and more intensive scrutiny.182 The FSA and the independent Bank of England have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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been important pillars of the light-regulation system. Predictably therefore, there will be a 
breakdown of the previous separation of elected politicians and financial regulators alongside the 
breakdown of the FSA and the independent system of Bank regulation.183 
The Vickers reform is perhaps the main reform expected to affect the fundamentals of British 
banking. The proposal by Sir John Vickers in his independent Commission’s report will split big 
banks and place separate retail operations behind a capital wall, or ringfence.184 This is intended 
to be an insurance against the problem of systemically important institutions. Because the City is 
such a global financial hub, its institutions far exceed the guarantor ability of the British 
government. With a ringfence in place, the authorities will be able to guarantee citizens’ savings 
whilst remove themselves from investment branches. It is important to note that this does not 
implicate the end of universal banking in Britain in the same way that Volcker does for the US. 
The British reform has been distinctly divergent in adhering to the specific policy demands put on 
its regulators following the crisis. 
5.2.2.5 Germany 
One important difference between the UK and Germany is that where the UK’s financial system 
centres on the City, the German system centres on its banking sector. In the German system, 
banks act as the intermediator between the financial market and firms.185 This gives quite 
extensive power to German banks, which is channelled through a corporate system. It also means 
that Germany has a long-term oriented credit market and is therefore more reliant on CRAs than 
a liberal market economy (LME) like Britain.186 Most notably, the German position on banking 
regulation is heavily influenced by its three-pillared banking system, consisting of a commercial 
sector, a public law administered sector, and a cooperative sector.187  
These pillars are separated by different financial structures, legal status and governance 
systems.188 As follows, each sector will have its own position to lobby. For example, Germany 
has traditionally been a proponent of tighter regional financial regulation, a position that is 
contested by the public sector banks. As a result of the local interest and coordination of banking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Froud (2010): 28 
184 Goff, S., & Parker, G. (2011 19-December). Coalition to accept Vickers 'in full'. Retrieved 2012 5-January from Financial Times: 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/912010163?accountid=12870 
185 Zimmermann (2010): 125 
186 Ibid.: 126 
187 Busch (2009): 92. 
188 Hardie and Howarth (2009): 1019. 
!99!
and the traditional strength of the public banking sector, the federal government has thus resigned 
itself to a comparatively hands-off approach.189 Nevertheless, the German government has long 
supported the elimination of the three-pillared system, and one way the GFC has influenced 
regulation in Germany has been to provide an opportunity for the government to achieve this 
goal.190 
Germany has not been impregnable to financial globalization. Its financial sector has developed a 
disadvantage in its ability to raise venture capital because of the economy’s reliance on banks.191 
Accordingly, financial globalization has helped force through reforms of uncompetitive sectors 
that significantly drive the banking system towards the areas of investment banking.192 
Concomitantly, Germany’s political leaders have adamantly pursued global regulation to keep 
newly established financial actors under control.193 Apparently, an inherent policy preference for 
Germany is to seek supranational solutions to its confining financial structure. 
5.2.2.6 Findings 
The different composition of each country’s banking sector is an important indicator of that 
country’s policy preferences. This section has shown that each of these cases have different ways 
of organizing their financial structure that also dictates the importance of banks in that structure. 
This demonstrates that each country will have different preferences regarding the regulation of 
banking, based on the influence of the sector in that specific case. This banking sector variation 
supports the argument that there is divergence in global banking regulation. 
5.2.3 Main Regulatory Bodies and Legislation 
We will examine the policy content and instruments through discussing the main bodies and 
legislation. The different banking systems rely on different acts and regulatory bodies to govern 
them. Of the country cases in this analysis it is the US that has undergone the most radical 
changes in terms of legislation. Its newly adopted Dodd-Frank Act is the lengthiest of its kind to 
date. However, in terms of structural adjustments to regulatory bodies, it is arguably Britain that 
has seen the most change with the dismantling of its FSA (although Germany has begun some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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similar reforms to consolidate power over its supervisory authorities). Germany’s stance has been 
consistent in that it is pursuing its changes at the regional level before implementing any 
individual changes. Canada on the other hand has been relatively quiet in its reform 
implementation, reflective of its policy interests as described in the previous sections. The 
purpose of this section is to show the variety of policy instruments drawn on by the four 
countries. These instruments are convincingly consequent to the policy interests already 
discussed. 
5.2.3.1 The US 
National Bank Act 
The base legislation that governs the regulation of federal banks is the National Bank Act of 
1863, which has been amended on several occasions. It is important to note that this Act concerns 
those banks categorized as national banks. As of such, there is another regulated marked between 
state banks that is also somewhat coordinated at the national level. 
OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC 
At the federal level, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) serves as the primary 
regulator and supervisor of national banks.194 State-chartered banks have to relate to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as the authority for non-members of the Federal Reserve 
System,195 or alternately, the Federal Reserve (the Fed), for those that are members of the 
system.196 In addition, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) supervises ‘thrifts’ or savings and 
loan association, whilst the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) handles credit 
unions.197 According to the DFA these agencies now all operate under the scrutiny of the new 
Financial Stability Oversight Council. 
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The DFA 
The DFA is the most recent regulatory piece of legislation and will thus reflect the framework 
that these regulatory bodies exist within. It has been described as the ‘most ambitious and far-
reaching overhaul of financial regulation since the 1930s (and the imposition of the Glass-
Steagall Act).198 Its underlying tasks are to: identify and regulate systemic risk; put an end to 
‘too-big-to-fail’; expand the responsibility and authority of the Federal Reserve (Fed); Restrict 
discretionary regulatory interventions; to reinstate a limited form of Glass-Steagall (the Volcker 
Rule); and to regulate the derivate market.199  
On the other hand, the Act does not take any steps towards consolidating the aforementioned 
fragmented regulatory and authority framework.200 Viral Acharya and his team of analysts 
conclude that the result of the Act’s shortcomings leaves ‘implicit government guarantees’ in 
certain pockets of the financial sector that will, through new financial innovation, lead to repeat 
problems of capital allocation further down the road.201 One prominent example where this is 
perhaps most evident is the failures of the Act to reform the GSEs.202 Indeed, banks are already 
poised to turn to such ‘financial alchemy’ to create elbowroom in the more stringent capital 
requirements,203 and the shadow banking system is expected to grow as institutions conjure up 
ways to evade DFA definitions.204  
The criticisms of the Act all seem to boil down to the conclusion that it does not incorporate a 
clear or consistent approach to the regulation of the financial sector due to not being decisive on 
the question of what banking is and what constitutes a bank.205 In several parts, the Act regulates 
a financial firm by its form (bank) rather than function (banking). This feature will prevent the 
Act from dealing well with the new organizational forms likely to emerge in the financial sector 
as well as from meeting the altered demands of global capital markets.206  
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The DFA is ambiguous on most accounts and is said to leave more questions than answers. In 
effect, the Act is a guideline for future regulators and therefore leaves several specifics 
unanswered. Yale Law School’s Jonathan Macey points out a poignant difference between more 
traditional pieces of legislation which directs itself at people and the DFA which performs more 
like an outline directed at bureaucrats instructing them to make ‘still more regulations.’207 Indeed, 
a major fear concerning the Act is the prevalence of blank spaces, which demand that regulators 
fill in further detail.208 
5.2.3.2 Canada 
Bank Act 
The primary statute governing Canadian banking is the federally legislated Bank Act. This act 
gives the federal government the exclusive jurisdiction to impose requirements on the banking 
sector.209 The act is governed under a policy of review and revision on a five-year interval, 
although the latest review was instigated two years ahead of schedule, in 2010.210 Besides that, 
the Canadian reform has been unsurprisingly stagnant. 
OSFI 
The main body responsible for the day-to-day oversight of regulation is the Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI/ the superintendent). It is within this office that 
requirements for capital adequacy, liquidity and leverage are set. The consolidation of financial 
supervisory authority in the single body of the OSFI is a major contributing reason as to why the 
Canadian system fared so well in the GFC.211 Furthermore, it is a key feature that distinguishes 
Canada from its neighbour. 
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5.2.3.3 The EU 
The EU has an advisory role when it comes to financial regulation. Most of its recommendations 
are developed within either the European System of Central Banks (the ESCB) or the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS).212 Marring the specificity of EU recommendations 
however, is the fact that these advisory bodies are quiet irrelevant due to the diversity in the 
institutional structures for supervising finances at the national level of the various members.213  
The Banking Directives and Supervisors 
EU banking is guided by the banking directives, the first of which was issued in 1977.214 For the 
purpose of this discussion, the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) is the most important as it is 
the document that directly relates to the Basel process. Besides these overarching directives, 
however, there are various new bodies that have recently emerged. 
Prior to the GFC, there were a limited amount of authoritative regulatory bodies relevant to bank 
and even financial regulation in the EU. The financial crisis has in some regards strengthened the 
work to establish functioning regional financial supervision. Although no plethora of institutions 
similar to the US system has emerged, there are a few new regulatory bodies that have the 
potential to consecrate regulatory oversight at the regional level in Europe. These are collectively 
categorized under the caption European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). 
ESAs 
These ESAs have been given the task of consolidating the supervision of banks.215 This regional 
supervision is to take place through ‘supervisory colleges’- flexible, permanent fora for collective 
supervision, headed by the home country and including countries hosting active branches of the 
institution in question.216 The ESA’s role with regards to these colleges is to ensure they apply 
and implement EU law consistently across financial institutions.217 The ESA has in this role 
replaced previous advisory committees and provide a more concrete tool for regional !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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authorities.218 Prior to the GFC, such coordination was lacking and this led to an array of 
responses during the crisis.219 The EU has therefore since worked to increase the appeal of the 
supervisory college approach to financial supervision. 
EBA 
The colleges will be imperative in shaping a common regulatory culture. One way to strengthen 
their ability to do so is through the application of the newly established European Banking 
Authority (EBA). The EBA’s mandate outlines it as an arbitrator between national supervisors, 
mostly restricted to issuing non-binding policy recommendations.220 It will operate through the 
colleges as an observer to encourage institution-wide views regarding prudential supervision.221 
Two major concerns for the proponents of EU supervision however, is the inability of the EBA to 
issue binding decisions and the restrictions brought onto EBA independence in the face of state 
appeals.222 
Although the newly constructed financial institutions have little formal authority to limit the 
capabilities of national regulation, it appears that states in the Union are working towards 
establishing new policy routes as alternatives to individual action. Particularly the supervisory 
colleges could support this effort by providing viable solutions to host/home conflicts. 
Developments within the CRD however, may hamper these efforts as the roles of home countries, 
or the ‘consolidating supervisor’, have been enhanced.223 As home countries are likely to be more 
affected by institutions’ exit threats, their interests are likely to conflict with international 
cooperation demanding prudent regulation. The conflict between international cooperation and 
nationalization of regulation seems to control the ability of the EU to formalize its authoritative 
power. For all purposes it seems the EU is intent upon continuing to rely on hopes for 
cooperation by coordination through committees. The outcome depends on the future of the 
newly established institutions, particularly the EBA. As one hopeful commentator has pointed 
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out; although given little substantial authority at the onset, such actors can be expected to play an 
increasing role in future EU regulatory developments.224 
5.2.3.4 The UK 
FSA/ FPC and PRA 
The major reform following the GFC was the abandonment of the FSA for the creation of new 
institutions, the FPC and the PRA, both lodged within the Bank of England. This not only marks 
the return of financial regulation to the central bank, but also a strengthening of supervisory tools. 
The FPC will identify risks in the financial system, but also has the mandate to take action 
against those risks.225 Analyst Robert Peston sees the possibility that the creation of the FPC with 
its ‘unprecedented powers over financial institutions’ marks the death of a ‘laissez-faire ideology’ 
that preceded the crisis.226 The PRA’s objective will be to contribute to the promotion of the 
stability of the British financial system, a task envisaged performed through a judgment-based 
supervisory approach.227 Although the reform rendered the supervisory institution less 
independent it is important to note, for comparison to other states’ practice, that supervision will 
still be held within one institution.  
In this case, the caveat is to be found within the interpretation of these ‘unprecedented powers’. 
The FPC’s mandate diffusely restricts the committee from taking actions it considers detrimental 
to the ‘capacity of the financial sector or to the growth of the UK economy.’228 With the 
questionable new direction of UK financial policy it seems too early to make any decisive 
conclusion on the future of the FPC. 
The Banking Act 
This is the act that governs UK banks. It now refers to the 2009 revision of previous documents, 
and thus to a decided change in philosophy regarding regulation.229 This change includes most !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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prominently allowing for banks to fail and accepting the cyclical nature of the economic 
system.230 As a result of these revisions the UK entered a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction to the GFC and 
was forced to undergo several consequent reforms, including the Turner Review, the White Paper 
on Financial Reform and the Walker Review.231  
5.2.3.5 Germany 
Supervisory Authorities 
BaFin and The Deutsche Bundesbank (collectively, the Supervisory Authorities) jointly supervise 
banks amongst other financial institutions; BaFin focuses mainly on solvency and market 
supervision whereas the Bundesbank is responsible for the ongoing monitoring process.232 
KWG 
With regards to legislation, German bankers have to conform to two acts. The German Banking 
Act (KWG) stipulates the fundamental regulatory provisions regarding the conduct of business of 
banks, now (after the GFC) particularly with the intent of dealing with troubled systemic 
important institutions.233 The Payment Services Regulation Act (ZAG), the second of these 
legislative documents sets Germany’s capital requirement demands. 
Following the crisis, Germany has been intent on restructuring the balance of power in its 
banking sector. This mostly refers to the influence of corporate sectors as mentioned. In addition 
Germany aims to overhaul the country’s existing supervisory institution. As part of this overhaul, 
the process of relocating banking supervision to the German Central Bank has been started, but 
not concluded as of yet. Thus far, a coalition agreement has proposed this relocation from the 
hands of BaFin, but this proposal has yet to be legislated.234 The practice of supervision will 
nevertheless retain a similar model to that brought in through reforms of the early 2000s, in that 
supervision is collected under the auspices of one institutional body.235 
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5.2.3.6 Findings 
The above discussion of legislation and regulatory bodies is important because these represent the 
existing frameworks that will channel and is channelling the reform. It was noted earlier that this 
study does not argue that the implementation of this reform is path dependent, and this is not the 
intent of this section. Where the reformed legislation and regulatory bodies show responses to the 
regulatory demands of each country, the lack of reform is equally important in reflecting policy 
interests.  
Two countries, the US and the UK have taken it on themselves to implement significant reforms; 
the US with the gargantuan DFA and the UK with the new FPC and its several reform reviews. 
Canada on the other hand has been content with a minor review of its primary legislation, 
indicating its preference for the status quo. There have been major reforms to the EU structure 
and the slow speed of reforms in Germany confirms other evidence that it is relying on these EU 
reforms to provide the necessary changes. Both EU members are furthermore looking to return 
the mandate to supervise to their central banks. Arguably the UK’s reforms, in terms of the 
degree of political involvement, have brought it closer to the EU model and it is possible that this 
signifies a regional convergence. It is also noticeable that all the four cases have pursued 
individual interests in their actions. 
5.2.4 Requirements and standards 
The following breakdown of some of the more specific facets of banking regulation is a response 
to the more frequently mentioned topics in the discussion of global banking. Two of these are 
continuations of contentious issues from previous rounds of discussion, that is capital 
requirements and credit rating, whilst the two remaining, leverage and liquidity, have become 
bigger issues due to post crisis discoveries. There are other regulatory issues that could be 
discussed, but these are the ones that have dominated the spotlight in international discussions, 
particularly those at the BCBS. 
5.2.4.1 Capital Requirements 
One of the biggest concerns of the Basel discussions dealt with the level of capital requirements a 
bank needs to uphold to reflect the risks of both the market and the specific investment choices of 
that institution. Simply put, capital requirements stipulate the minimum ratio between regulatory 
capital and total risk weighted assets (capital ratio) an institution is allowed. This means that 
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requirements are also sensitive to how capital is defined. Capital is normally categorized into 3 
tiers. Defining these tiers is a different matter altogether, as the different banking systems’ 
structures results in specific requirements of different persuasions.  
The standardization of definition therefore makes up a heated discussion between countries. The 
problem of capital definition is bigger in Europe, where the debated types of capital feature more 
prominently on banks balance sheets.236 In fact, neither has there been a unilateral nor a 
collaborated EU move to push actively for a new Basel agreement on capital adequacy.237 As 
opposed to the US, both the UK and Germany have been aligned in their opposition to new 
capital definitions that exclude hybrid capital from the tier 1 (the most important to risk 
management) tranche.238  
It is natural that capital requirements have become a central discussion, as capital requirements 
have been pivotal to the BCBS in other rounds also. Thus far there seems to be general support 
for the capital requirement recommendations of Basel III between the cases discussed here. The 
important factor to notice is how each country expects to implement new standards through pre-
existing frameworks that will likely influence the form this takes. Therefore the purpose behind 
the following accounts is not necessarily to highlight the specific ratios, but rather the divergence 
in intended method for adapting capital requirements. Two of the more notable cases are 
Germany and the US, where the banking sector is divided into different categories that define the 
requirements for capital. 
5.2.4.1.1 The US 
In monitoring capital requirements, the DFA divides US banks into those that are well capitalized 
and those that are adequately capitalized. Based on prior standards, the DFA’s Collins 
Amendment demands a Tier 1 risk based capital ratio of 6% for well-capitalized institutions and 
4% for those that are adequately capitalized. This amounts to a total risk based capital ratio (all 
tiers included) of 10% for well-capitalized and 8% for adequately capitalized banks.239 
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One important aspect of the Collins Amendment is that it includes a provision for excluding 
hybrid securities from Tier 1 capital.240 In addition, the Fed has proposed to issue separate rules 
for foreign-based institutions to which the US plays host.241 Lastly, the DFA differs from Basel in 
that it distinguishes between large and small banks in its implementation schedule; larger banks 
are given less time to phase out hybrid securities, or lesser forms of capital, from their Tier 1 base 
than smaller ones.242  
In addition to setting requirements for Tier 1 capital, the DFA opens for the possibility of 
allowing contingent capital as an additional form of capital for Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFI).243 This category, which includes CoCo bonds, is a form of uninsured debt that 
converts into equity upon the achievement of certain pre-specified triggers.244 The importance of 
this relates to the uncertainty surrounding this untraditional form of capital and a global 
reluctance to accept it. A decision on this possibility will follow a recommendation of an 
expected report. 
5.2.4.1.2 Canada 
Capital regulation in Canada is based on two focal points: both minimum risk-based capital ratio 
(as in the Basel agreements) and maximum assets-to-capital multiple restrictions.245 Although 
capital requirements are based on Basel, Canadian minimum thresholds have traditionally been 
set higher (compared to Basel II), at 7 percent for Tier 1 capital and 10 percent for total capital.246 
In addition, the assets-to-capital multiple, which denotes that banks total assets cannot be more 
than a certain multiple of their total capital, is restricted to a maximum multiple of 20.247 Current 
developments include an aim to incorporate the new Basel requirements for capital into this 
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system, with Canadian interpretations of the standards being processed through the normal course 
of action within OSFI.248 
5.2.4.1.3 The EU 
The collective policies of the CRD basically reflect the standards set through Basel. As the most 
recent amendments to the Accord have yet to be phased in, the policies are accordingly still to be 
synchronized. The last formal changes made to the CRD (CRD III) do however take into account 
the new standards for capital requirements and these are currently pressuring European banks to 
accumulate capital.249 The upcoming fourth directive mirrors the requirements of Basel III, but 
gives a comparably detailed definition of common equity (the main aspect of Tier 1 capital). One 
concern regarding this is that these definitions diverge from Basel III.250 
Within the EU, the emphasis has been placed on securitization and re-securitization, as well as 
classifying ‘hybrid capital’, a contentious issue particularly for Germany.251 The proposal 
recommends a common equity Tier 1 ratio of 4.5% and a total capital ratio of 8% that is 
comparable to the recommendations of Basel.252 However, in attempting to stem the recent 
banking crisis, EU finance ministers have shown a willingness to increase these numbers. 
Through the recapitalization plan they have demanded that banks achieve a temporary 9% Tier 1 
buffer by June 2012, two years earlier than the 6% aim of Basel for 2014.253 If these aims are 
upheld it shows that the EU can act decisively in changing its financial parameter, without 
regards to Basel’s minimum requirements.  
The proposal has been met with contention on one particular point regarding harmonization of 
the European market. This legal element (article 5.1 of the CRD) becomes particularly 
problematic combined with article 87 on capital requirements. Essentially the principle restrains 
national authorities from imposing individual higher minimum capital requirements than those of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
248 OSFI. (2011, February 1). Basel III Implementation: Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Requirements. Retrieved February 6, 2012 from OSFI: 
http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/cptlq_e.pdf: 1 
249 The Economist. (2011 9-April). European Banks: Topping Up. The Economist. 
250 Veron (2012):16 
251 Stichele, M. V. (2009 September). An Oversight of Selected Financial Reforms on the EU Agenda:. Retrieved 2011 12-November from 
SOMO: http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3221 
252 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions, Insurance 
Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate. (CRD IV) (2011). In European Commission Archives. Retrieved October 10, 
2011, from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/CRD4_reform/20110720_directive_proposal_en.pdf: Article 87 
253 Lannoo, K. (2012 30-January). Europe Needs to Flex its Muscles with Banks. Retrieved 2012 8-Feburary from Financial Times: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/02c7968a-41c3-11e1-a586-00144feab49a.html 
!:<!
CRD IV.254 This is particularly difficult with the UK, which has aimed at setting higher 
standards. 
As a last note, it should be pointed out that the CRD IV regulation proposal allows for CoCo 
bonds as Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1). This happens upon the trigger condition that the Tier 1 
capital ratio of an institution falls below 5.125%.255 In this sense, the European regulation is one 
step ahead of US developments. 
5.2.4.1.4 The UK 
With regards to capital requirements, British interim minimum ratios are higher than what Basel, 
and subsequently the CRD demands.256 British regulators have inquired into continuing this 
trend. For example, in its conclusion the Independent Banking Commission advised chancellor 
Osborne on the inadequacy of the Basel III capital requirements.257 The same commission has 
recently recommended a British requirement of 10 percent of core Tier 1 capital; substantially 
more than what Basel recommends.258 Furthermore, there seems to be a silent support amongst 
even City investors for maverick prudency in Britain.259  
In addition to recommending increased prudency, British regulators have also introduced 
extraordinary legislation through the freedom given by interpretive liberties in the current EU 
directive (in waiting for CRD IV). The UK strictly defines standards for capital instruments, 
determinants of bank specific requirements, as well as other technical details that the Banking 
sector fears puts it at a disadvantage.260 This marks an unprecedented degree of regulatory 
involvement for London. 
British capital requirements are outlined in the GENPRU sourcebook given by the FSA. This 
document provides a great extent of variations for different categories of financial institutions and 
by doing so provides more specific standards than the other examples. Furthermore, British !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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guidelines for tier 1 capital definitions rely on noticeably different terms compared with the 
legislation of both Canada and the US (as the two other English speaking examples). Although 
the different terms refer to similar concepts, it is likely that they carry connotations that cause 
deviation in the interpretations. 
5.2.4.1.5 Germany 
The KWG states that banks must maintain an adequate liquidity for payment purposes at all times 
as well as appropriate capital and adequate funds.261  The required standards are built on those of 
CRD II and CRD III as implemented into German law. If all goes according to procedure, they 
are expected to be upgraded to the standards of Basel III as it is processed through the EU 
structure.262 However one important difference remains. Germany stands out in its definition of 
capital by segmenting its guidelines to reflect the three different types of banks seen in its 
financial sector. This means that although the German Tier 1 requirements appear similar to the 
ones found in the other cases, they offer definitions more specifically tailored to the German 
market, something that allows for different interpretations deviating from international norms.  
It should be noted that although it is built on the CRD, German regulation does already require 
capital reserves above what CRD II recommends.263 The process of further upgrading capital 
requirements has been delayed in Germany due to the nature of the German economy, which is as 
mentioned centred on banks rather than financial institutions like those of London’s capital 
market. This delay has particularly been caused by the attempt to define Tier 1 capital, where 
German banks are trying to defend the use of ‘hybrid capital’, but also in the negotiation of the 
time framework for implementing the new directives.264 Interestingly, Germany has lobbied for 
the loosening of EU capital rules, apparently to avoid the revelation of bad loans that plague its 
banking system.265 Lobbying in this way has undermined the faith in Germany’s own 
requirements and generated the impression that Berlin is reluctant to enforce the necessary 
measures on its own banks.266 
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5.2.4.2 Leverage Ratio 
One of the findings following the GFC was the discovery of astonishingly high leverage ratios of 
some financial institutions. Simply put, leverage measures the size of ‘bet’ on every dollar of a 
firm’s capital by pointing out the ratio between assets to equity. Monitoring leverage has become 
pertinent as a result of this discovery in the symptoms of the crisis. For example, the lead-up to 
the crisis saw the leverage ratio of some of the US’s most troublesome institutions increase 
manifold, in one case climbing from 20:1 to 40:1 in five years.267 Whilst operable in pre-crisis 
times, excessive leverage became a problem once lending cycles were broken and borrowers 
were coming up empty in their repayments. It has since become noted that capital requirements 
need to be augmented by restrictions on leverage ratios. 
The reception of this proposition has diverged between the different countries. It is therefore 
likely that the implementation of leverage standards will be contested in some cases, particularly 
in Europe where the problem of overleveraging has been rampant. In this section it is important 
to note that both Canada and the US have the necessary tools for monitoring leverage already in 
place, whereas these have not been prioritized previously in Europe. Furthermore, there seems to 
be a split in the position of Germany and the UK regarding this requirement. This indicates a 
divergence in policy interests and contents. 
5.2.4.2.1 The US 
Although the US was among few countries that imposed restrictions on leveraging prior to the 
crisis, its regulatory blind eye to shadow banking allowed institutions to nevertheless 
circumnavigate these restrictions. Now, through the DFA however, Leverage ratio requirements 
are legislatively equivalent with capital requirements and are an important tool for the 
restructuring of US regulation. Rather than set a minimum requirement, the Act leaves the 
decision up to the ‘appropriate agency’ only requiring that the minimum does not drop below 
those in existence prior to the implementation of the Act.268 The categorical separation of banks 
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in terms of size is recurrent for these standards also. The current floor demands leverage ratios of 
5% for well-capitalized banks and 4% for adequately capitalized ones.269 
5.2.4.2.2 Canada 
The aforementioned assets-to-capital multiple (ACM) is in effect Canada’s leverage ratio. The 
legislation insists on a maximum multiple of 20 times total capital, which corresponds to a 
leverage ratio of 5 percent (as compared to Basel’s 3 percent).270 It should be noted that Canada 
was the only country in this study besides the US to impose such a constraint on its banks prior to 
the crisis. Nevertheless, Canada is unique in requiring all of a financial group’s activities to be 
included in the calculation of this multiple,271 and as such is the most complete example of 
supervised leverage in this analysis. The complete definition of leverage has been transferred to 
the new Basel standard, one instance where Canada has managed to act as a leader.272  
The strict supervision of leverage prevented the exploitation of regulatory loopholes in the 
Canadian financial system and the subsequent development of a shadow-banking sector as in the 
case of the US.273 Currently OSFI is considering the effects of Basel III’s leverage ratio. The 
superintendent expects to interpret the ratio within the ACM system already in place.274 
5.2.4.2.3 The EU275 
Prior to the crisis leverage was only lightly constrained by EU authorities.276 As a result, 
overleveraging has become a major issue for European financial institutions. Jacopo Carmassi 
claims that mitigation techniques encouraged by previous Basel capital rules are the primary 
reason for EU leverage problems.277 Perhaps the biggest problem was the lack of an effective 
ceiling on leverage, a major regulatory weakness identified in hindsight.278 Despite this, the EU 
has not taken any prominent steps to address this issue. In fact, some EU members have fears that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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new leverage standards will cause significant economic harm.279 At the current stage, CRD IV is 
due to implement a requirement that institutions calculate leverage ratios, but unlike Basel III it 
does not relate these to a minimum standard.280 Leverage ratios have actually increased in the 
Union following the crisis. 
5.2.4.2.4 The UK 
Amidst plans to implement European minimum standards, the UK is planning to enforce its 
banks to publicize their leverage ratios in 2013, which is two years before the planned 
implementation of similar measures by both Basel and the EU.281 Rather than political prudence, 
this seems to be a response to growing market concern on banks’ honesty regarding Tier 1 capital 
ratios.282 This move appears to be the major independent decision by UK authorities, and a clear 
contrast to its European counterpart, Germany. 
5.2.4.2.5 Germany 
German bankers have, through the Association of German Banks (BDB), taken an adamant 
stance against any form of leverage cap.283 Bundesbank president Axel Weber on the other hand 
has praised Basel’s insistence on including the concept in its new proposals.284 Leverage is an 
important term of disagreement between the authorities and the powerful banking sector. 
Germany is expected to conform to CRD IV leverage requirements, and as a result, German 
banks have been vehement in voicing its concern over these.285 It is still too early to say how 
Germany will handle this situation in any specific detail. 
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5.2.4.3 Liquidity 
Liquidity, or the capacity of a banking institution to generate currency in time to meet its 
commitments, is referred to as the Gordian knot of the financial crisis.286 The BCBS defines it as 
the ‘ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses.’287 It has indeed evolved into a highly complicated problem for 
finance ministers, particularly in the Eurozone. This problem is mirrored in the concerns of 
regulators, where there is a growing fear that individual answers to financial governance will lead 
to increased liquidity problems.288 The regulation of liquidity refers to not only the requirements 
directed to ratio of liquid assets, but also what assets are to be considered liquid.  
The different country cases show that liquidity requirements have been handled on an individual 
basis so far. Both the UK and Germany have codified new laws, but done so autonomous of EU 
coordination. Despite there being consensus on the necessity of liquidity requirements, countries 
seem eager to diverge in the implementation of this instrument. 
5.2.4.3.1 The US 
The DFA is rather vague on liquidity requirements, but it is assumed that regulators will look to 
Basel III for the specifics.289 The stated intention by the Fed is to rely on banks’ own internal 
modelling to find liquidity needs. Together with the inclusion of GSE securities in the category of 
‘highly liquid assets’ this is viewed as an important victory for the banking industry.290 The 
opaque stand on liquidity is one of the indicators that the DFA simply perpetuates laissez-faire 
policies. 
5.2.4.3.2 Canada 
As mentioned, the primary response to the crisis in Canada was an intervention in the short-term 
lending market by the Federal government. In other words, the intervention was to provide 
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liquidity to improve credit conditions.291 Liquidity constraint was thus a big concern for the 
Canadian authorities following the GFC.292 Nevertheless, no new liquidity standards have been 
introduced as a result. The superintendent stipulates that banks establish vaguely defined ‘sound’ 
and ‘prudent’ liquidity policies recommended and approved internally.293 These guidelines are 
expected to be upgraded to comply with the international rules for bank liquidity of Basel III. So 
far, however, the OSFI has shown caution in acceding to the Basel recommendations, waiting on 
extensive testing prior to their implementations.294 
5.2.4.3.3 The EU295 
The Basel recommendations concerning liquidity are being reviewed in the current rounds of 
consultations for CRD IV. The proposals thus far resemble the standards set by the Basel 
committee in that they require the two new ratios as well as the four proposed monitoring tools 
that have been recommended. They EU proposals do distinguish themselves in that they table 
suggestions for more universal supervision (including both parent and subsidiary financial 
institutions and also investment firms dealing with their own accounts), and are as such stricter 
than the Basel recommendations.  
However, there has been a resistance towards the development of tighter EU level liquidity 
restrictions. As a result, both the UK and Germany seem to have followed their own paths 
towards regulating liquidity at this stage in their regulatory response.296 
5.2.4.3.4 The UK 
The reformed UK policy path can particularly be seen within the category of liquidity. Rather 
uncharacteristic to the British paradigm, the UK was quick to implement a set of liquidity rules 
including a liquidity adequacy rule, liquidity assessment standards, and a liquidity buffer system 
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appropriate to the risk profile and activities of individual institutions.297 These rules essentially 
match the global efforts that other countries have been reserved against implementing.298 
Although earlier developments pointed to a return to normal, with regulators considering diluting 
the measures,299 banking sector lobbying was not successful in turning over the increased 
liquidity stringency. At the discussion through ‘Project Merlin’, banks argued that the British 
legislation puts them at a disadvantage internationally- an argument that gained sympathy with 
exchequer chancellor Osborne.300 Nevertheless, Britain’s stance has held and even proved 
beneficial to British banks, many of which are now privately relieved the authorities proved so 
resilient.301 
5.2.4.3.5 Germany 
Germany has implemented liquidity requirements through its MaRisk act pre-emptively to the 
implementation of CRD recommendations. These requirements are tailored to individual banks 
based on size, complexity, and circumstance.302 MaRisk has since the third round of Basel been 
revised to include liquidity buffers and other points of importance from the accord.303 The 
German interpretation of the European guidelines has been to limit the new requirements to 
capital-market oriented institutions.304 
5.2.4.4 Regulating Credit Rating 
The rating of credit is central to determining the stability of banks. In a discussion of the BCBS’s 
analysis of the regulatory uses of credit ratings, Amadou Sy concludes that credit ratings are an 
‘essential part of the regulatory process for identifying assets that are eligible for investment 
purposes, for determining capital requirements and for providing an evaluation of credit risk.’305 
Higher rated bonds and securities are given special status with respect to capital requirements, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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and are less demanding for financial institutions to hold. For example, in the US prior to the 
crisis, zero capital requirements were needed for an AAA rated security if an AAA rated 
insurance company provided credit enhancement for it.306 Government reliance upon credit rating 
as a method of supervision makes it crucial to the regulation of banks. 
One aspect that adds a bias to this method is governments’ dependence on credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) in providing the necessary ratings. This is due to the circumstance that the most 
influential agencies are located in the US. This gives the US market a clear advantage and could 
possibly put pressure on other countries’ legislators to converge with the US model. To find 
divergence in this category we would look for states to attempt to secure their independence from 
standard reliance on CRAs. 
5.2.4.4.1 The US 
US regulation relies on CRAs; since the 1930s, CRAs have been placed as the central source of 
information about the creditworthiness of bonds in US financial markets.307 This policy was 
institutionalized through the establishment of the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO), which gave special roles to a few designated rating agencies.308 These 
agencies worked according to an ‘solicited rating’ business model, where the issuer of securities 
both chooses and pays the rating agency for its services allowing it to ‘shop around’ for the best 
possible rating.309 It has been widely argued that this conflict of interest and overall reliance on a 
few designated agencies played a central role in catalyzing the financial crisis.310 
The DFA goes to measures to corral this problem by mentioning new improved internal controls 
and rating accuracy standards for agencies as well as removing the regulatory reliance on 
ratings.311 Compared to the path of the EU and Canada, these new measures emphasize 
transparency as their main focus. 312 However, according to Altman and his colleagues, the Act is 
less forceful in removing the problem of ‘incentive misalignment in the solicited rating model’ 
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(although it does prohibit CRAs from making recommendations to the issuer it is rating).313 
Overall, the reforms of the DFA does not include a change of policy in terms of risk 
measurement, but remains reliant on the calculation of default risk by rating agencies. This 
perpetuates one of the determining factors of the GFC, namely the regulatory focus on individual 
bank risk rather than a consideration of overall systemic risk.314 
5.2.4.4.2 Canada 
Canadian regulation only recognizes ratings issued by ‘approved’ or ‘recognized’ rating agencies, 
a rather limiting category with few alternatives. Agencies are defined as approved or recognized 
through a rudimentary listing of the larger CRAs.315 Institutions that receive permission may also 
follow the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB) and supervise their own credit rating. Thus far 
in the reform process, decision makers in the Canadian Securities Administration (CSA) are 
analyzing whether to look to the approach taken by the US in deciding whether to maintain, 
modify or delete references to CRAs in Canadian legislation.316 
The proposal that has been amassed through this process emphasizes disclosure and transparency. 
This ‘disclosure based model’ relies on the public disclosure of all information provided by an 
institution seeking a credit rating for an asset-backed security.317 In principle, such disclosure 
would enable other CRAs to issue ‘unsolicited ratings’ for which to counterbalance the incentive 
for agencies to sell favourable ratings to attract business (discussed further in the US section.)318 
A final point that the CSA emphasize is that the disclosure-based approach would provide a 
framework that fosters compliance with the IOSCO code of conduct.319 
5.2.4.4.3 The EU 
Although the reliance on credit rating is quite similar within the EU as it is in the US, the EU has 
been remarkably opaque in its regulation. Before the crisis, the EU relied upon self-regulation 
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within the framework of the IOSCO Code.320 In recent developments however, the CRD has been 
relatively direct in its requirements for credit assessment as compared to Basel’s proposals.321 
Recent developments have shown a remarkable shift in the European policy direction. The new 
focus seems to be quite rigorous state regulation of CRAs.322 Indeed there seems to have been 
significant progress at the EU level in regulating agencies, possibly because restricting their 
operations is less sensitive for the national governments of EU members.323 As a result, CRAs 
were moved under a single regulatory regime early on in the crisis response process.324 
Similar to the US, new regulation dealing with the conflict of interest problem (solicited rating) 
prohibits a CRA from providing consultation or advisory services to an entity it is also providing 
ratings for.325 It should also be noted that EU legislation is more precise than that of the US,326 
and the EU is attempting to alleviate its regulation’s reliance on rating agencies.327 In these ways, 
the EU proposal for the regulation of CRAs goes further than any other country’s equivalent.328 
5.2.4.4.4 The UK 
In determining credit risk, UK banks have a choice between a standardized approach with pre-set 
categories, and advanced approaches where internal models are an option.329 The 2009 Turner 
Review, which set out the proposals of the FSA, also covered CRAs. The proposals relevant to 
credit rating suggested a decreased reliance on agencies, urging that ratings only be used for the 
purposes to which they were suited.330 As the same review pointed to CRAs role in sharing 
responsibility for the GFC,331 it is not surprising that the UK also takes a regulatory step away 
from relying on such agencies. 
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5.2.4.4.5 Germany 
BaFin has refined and extended its requirements for risk management (MaRisk) following the 
global meltdown. These extensions include more ‘rigorous and wide-ranging international risk 
management standards’.332 To confirm this, a 2008 was sceptical of rating agencies, particularly 
towards relying on these in national regulation.333 Nevertheless, there have not been any 
remarkable codified shifts in German policy and authorized CRAs will continue to play an 
important role in the Germany banking system. 
5.2.5 Findings 
The preceding section has examined how the US, Canada, the UK and Germany have interpreted 
the different categories that have dominated the regulatory reform discussion. Restricting the 
discussion in such a way indicates that there has already been a great deal of coordination 
achieved. If countries agree upon which factors should be involved in the overhaul of their 
banking systems, they share quite extensive common grounds. Some of these factors, such as 
capital adequacy and relying on ratings agencies are remnants of previous discussions that have 
re-emerged, whilst leverage and liquidity have been new and hot topics of the latest rounds. 
On the other hand, as the cases show, there are both prevalent as well as possible differences in 
the political acceptance of globally standardized reforms. As the regulation of banking is highly 
technical and its international coordination is often delegated to experts, the apparent minor 
differences in regulatory interpretation could be larger than what they first appear. The following 
analysis sector will attempt to examine the effects of these apparent differences. 
6. Analysis 
This discussion will focus on the similarities and contrasts in policy that were observed in the 
preceding chapter and thus address international outcomes, or the second step of the procedure. 
Looking at how the cases compare, the aim is to understand whether the cases have converged or 
diverged in reregulating global finance. Understanding the four different cases in the preceding 
chapter provides a fundament for exploring developments that deviate from status quo regulation.  
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This discussion will ultimately show the global divergence in banking regulation. The main 
indicators are the break up of the ‘club’ negotiation environment of Basel and the simultaneous 
emergence of increased inter-state regulatory competition as predicted in section ‘9$"! ’. The 
agreements reached in the most recent round of Basel are at best ‘sham standards’ (see table 2 in 
section ‘#$"$#! &IJ! MOSJLOFSMDOFC! LJWGCFSDLY! UDDLPMOFSMDO! ZDPJC’). This indicates a higher 
degree of conflict, or divergence, than expected by convergence theory. To introduce the analysis 
according to the two-step procedure, we must first complete the model description by outlining 
the international intentions and influences of the different countries. According to Bennett we 
should here focus on policy goals. These will help contextualize the model cases when we 
discuss them in terms of the theory.  
6.1.1 The US 
The initial American response to the crisis was inwardly focused much in the way we saw 
happened following the junk bond crisis and lead-up to Basel I. This response, encapsulated in 
the DFA followed the Lehman Brothers’ default and targeted specifically breaking up universal 
banking and reconfiguring market infrastructure.334 It is the keystone to the financial reform 
structure in the United States and is thus assumed by some analysts to be influential at the 
international level, despite the aforementioned inward focus.335  
Not only has the US focus been introverted, it has also been fast-tracked. The US was the first 
among the world’s leading economies in drafting its new regulatory architecture, this being 
signed by president Obama roughly three months before the G-20 endorsement of Basel III.336 
Furthermore, it was the Obama administration that took the lead internationally with regards to 
regulatory reforms by arguing against hybrid capital and codifying leverage rules.337 
The DFA ‘pays little real attention’ to international cooperative efforts.338 Cooley and Walter 
claim that the Obama administration and the US Congress assumed that as the DFA reforms were 
the first to appear, they would inevitably become the template for global financial 
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restructuring.339 This assumption is reflected in the attitude on Basel III implementation; draft 
regulations are not yet available and big banks are placing the implementation on the sidelines in 
contrast to racing to apply the demands of the DFA.340 On the other hand, EU leaders have made 
public statements that they do not intend to follow the recipe given by the US.341 Also 
Comparably to the junk bond crisis, the international influence of US regulators is likely 
hampered by its reputation of inefficiency and overlapping agencies. It is therefore unlikely that 
the US will assertively enact its position on the international level.342  
It should be mentioned that although the DFA and Basel have similar objectives, there are 
important differences. These are found particularly in the capital requirements and the 
implementation schedules.343 The differences between the Basel guidelines and the legal 
framework of the DFA undermine the international consensus and open for the possibility of 
Basel III arbitrage.344 Particularly the Volcker restriction stands out as a major difference. It is not 
surprising that it has caused trouble among domestic actors. More striking, however, is the protest 
it has generated from other actors, amongst them Canada and the EU, who fear that the Volcker 
Rule will disrupt liquidity in the international market.345  
Noticeably, the DFA does not clearly or consistently approach the financial sector; it combines a 
‘great deal of modified laissez-faire’ with a lack of anchoring in a definition of regulatory 
responsibilities and functions.346 The concern here is that it does nothing to contain the 
fragmentation of the US banking system, yet restricts the consolidation of international standards 
by differing from Basel guidelines. The US has, through this act, taken a discernable stance as an 
autonomous actor in the face of global governance efforts. 
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6.1.2 Canada 
Canada had the potential to play an important role in Basel III negotiations. As noted, Canada 
emerged out of the crisis relatively unscathed, and its conservative minority government was 
eager to not only exploit this domestically, but also on the international stage. As we have seen in 
the discussion of Canadian banking regulation, the main principle guiding policy makers was 
prudence. This was therefore the core to finance minister Jim Flaherty’s international proposal.  
More importantly however, Canada sought to eke out space for its own autonomy. Canada is 
perhaps the state most expected to succumb to great power coercion, simply due to its proximity 
to the US.  Canada lobbied to moderate the new minimum capital levels in order to ensure the 
possibility of different business models and national regulatory frameworks.347 This suggests that 
Ottawa was reaching out to establish normative precedence to support its own deviance from the 
US model. Rather than aggressively front its own successful regulation as an ideal for global 
standard, Canada sought to preserve its own internal policy preferences. 
Therefore, Canadian rhetoric and position of moral superiority did not translate into substance in 
the form of driving policy. Lesser breakthroughs were celebrated. For example, upon one 
apparent breakthrough for a Canadian proposal (bank debt as equity), Mr. Flaherty stated that 
‘Canada continues to play a lead role in focusing financial reform discussion.’348 Other perhaps 
more unbiased commentators have been disappointed by the Canadian impotency at the global 
level. Mark White of the OSFI claims Canada were ‘doves’ in the Basel III negotiations, arguing 
that the country’s relative strength and moral ground following the crisis came from an innate 
culture rather than regulation-based prudency.349 This is most likely a symptom of the attempt by 
Ottawa to maximize its individual freedom and focus inwardly rather than promote itself as a 
global model. 
In fact, the Canadian bank system is characteristically inwards-focused as exemplified by the lack 
of exposure to the same ‘toxic’ debt that European and US institutions were subject to. As 
mentioned, the few bigger banks are quite dominating and have a history of being involved in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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their own regulation. This, in combination with Canada’s seemingly inwards focused market 
structure, suggests that nationally imposed strict regulation is likely to be welcomed to corral the 
domestic market and lock out foreign competitors.350 Apparently there are strong interests for 
Canada to maximize its national autonomy. 
6.1.3 The EU 
The focus in this analysis is on the state, however a few points should be noted regarding the 
inter-national cohesion of the EU given the moniker Europeanization.351 Strikingly, members of 
the EU took an early coordinated stance in responding to the GFC, specifically agreeing on a 
common ‘line’ on international financial issues for the 2009 G20 summit and the same year’s 
Spring European Council.352 Cohesive action on the international stage adds leverage to the EU 
bargaining chip, something Germany has been eager to develop.353 If the various members agree 
on a common direction, it is likely that they will act in a europeanized way. Arguably the EU has 
succeeded in this and as a result been one of the most active proponents on international 
reform.354 
Because the EU position on finance is distinctly different from the international regulatory trend 
of market liberalization,355 the success of Europeanization is interesting. The EU position 
combines free market determinants with socially protective regulation.356 In addition EU policy 
priorities have shifted from ensuring level internal competition to providing financial stability.357 
Although there is an agreement around such principles, the EU has struggled to cohesively 
combine contending European financial models as made apparent by the squabbles between 
Germany and the UK. If the EU is cohesive in promoting these preferences it will likely increase 
global divergence. 
In a discussion of EU cohesion, Elliot Posner argues that despite existing national rivalries and 
the ‘frequent absence of a single voice’, the EU has expanded its international agenda as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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competitor to US financial leadership.358 He argues that ‘more than merely ensuring level playing 
fields, EU representatives (…) seek to use their decade-long expanding and newly developed 
capacities and regulatory approach to turn Europe into a regulation-maker’ rather than adopt US 
moulds. 359 European regulators have found themselves asking ‘why converge with the US, when 
the US financial system is to blame for the crisis’.360 This shift appears to have coincided with the 
decrease in political relevance of London based financial actors after the crisis.361 
Arguably, the EU financial system has different needs than the general requirements of Basel 
tailor to. This is the stance Karel Lannoo takes in her recommendations for CRD IV.362 For 
instance, Europe’s recent stress tests that emphasized the core Tier 1 ratio, were unable to point 
out major flaws in the banking system. The EU should therefore give the leverage ratio a much 
more central role compared to Basel.363 These specific conditions stimulate EU actions that are 
divergent from (most noticeably) the US model.  
6.1.4 The UK 
It is interesting to see the apparent British paradigm shift under the pressure of the GFC and the 
consequent decrease in confidence in liberal financial practice. Whilst some predict that this is 
probably not a lasting case,364 British regulators actually appear to have left the opportunity open 
for future strengthening of Westminster control. Major reforms have been instigated despite City 
reluctance and a political passing of batons between prime ministers Brown and Cameron. 
With regards to European convergence, the UK voiced concerns with some European reform 
proposals,365 but on the other hand emerged as a policy entrepreneur in the initial response to the 
crisis.366 The City has traditionally viewed EU regulation as a vital threat to its global 
competitiveness.367 When the reform proposals collided with the British policy paradigm in their 
decisive turn away from market-based regulation, this resulted in demands by the financial sector 
in London for continued UK independence. However, the market-making approach had been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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delegitimized also in British political circles. Consequently, the UK has seen a collision of 
interests in responding to the GFC. The result of this collision has been an opportunity for 
Westminster to take advantage of its ability to implement fundamental reforms. 
Much of the UK regulatory reform has happened internally, from the bottom- up. It has instigated 
its own commissions, such as the aforementioned Independent Banking Commission, to generate 
policy recommendations. Furthermore, the UK has been an entrepreneur of national policy, most 
specifically in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.368 There has been a reluctance to secede 
power to regional authorities, and a drive to allow individual (stricter) stability demands than 
those of the EU. Rather than lobby the EU to accept its standards, Britain has been concerned that 
EU agreements would impede its reforms.369 Part of this effort seems to have been directed by 
City interests in opposition to those of the Union.370 This policy direction has caused some 
concern with continental EU members who fear that exaggerated individualism could harm 
European unity.371 This sets Britain apart from particularly Germany, where policy has been 
channelled primarily through the EU framework. 
The result of this seems to have been a political recapture of some areas of financial governance 
rather than capitulation to City demands. Britain has been nationally proactive in recasting 
technical demands such as capital demands as well as in overhauling its banking system through 
returning to central bank oversight and developing the Vicker’s reform. 
6.1.5 Germany 
The disillusionment with Anglo-American neoliberalism has triggered a ‘rethink’ of previous 
regulatory models, consequently stimulating activism amongst contenders to these models.372 
Germany has emerged as a contributor to this activism. Berlin’s response to the crisis was in part 
influenced by the segmented nature of the banking sector, but also by the relative success of 
banks to solve their problems on an individual basis.373 This led to a response that was mostly 
aimed at addressing the international financial structure and hence the focus on domestic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
368 Quaglia (2009) 
369 Goff, S., & Parker, G. (2011 19-December). Brussels Eases Fears on Vickers Reforms. Retrieved 2012 5-January from Financial Times: 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/912010157?accountid=12870 
370 Johnson, J. (2011 5-December). Don't Drape the City in a Union Flag: it's an Asset to All Europe. Retrieved 2011 7-December from Financial 
Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5196bc4a-1d2a-11e1-a134-00144feabdc0.html 
371 Barker, A., & Masters, B. (2012 22-January). EU Regulator Urges Cameron to 'Play the Game'. Retrieved 2012 8-February from Financial 
Times: www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3523b340-4531-11e1-be2b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1lhe9SepM 
372 Moschella (2011): 108 
373 Hardie and Howarth (2009): 1031 
!?9!
regulation has been delayed. One important point to highlight is that the EU's policy converged 
with the coordinated-market approach promoted by Germany, emphasizing Germany’s role as a 
policy entrepreneur.  
However, Germany, like the UK has not been an active proponent of increased prudency on the 
international level. It has not unilaterally moved to strengthen the quality of capital of European 
banks, and neither has it pushed actively for the new Basel agreement.374 In fact, the German 
government’s policy on capital adequacy has contradicted its norm of promoting tighter EU and 
international regulation.375 Arguably, this responsive and retroactive approach is partly due to the 
nature of Germany’s banking sector, as German politicians have seemed generally positive to 
global initiatives. 
In this light, it is interesting to note that an international approach is strongly contested by 
Germany’s publicly administered banks. On the other hand, private sector banks have been in 
tune with EU proposals. Between these two sectors, the commercial banks have been reluctantly 
in agreement with European supervision. The federal government has been influenced by the 
lobbying efforts of all sectors and its position has consequently been obfuscated.376 It has issued 
both messages of support for international cooperation as well as resistance to certain aspects, 
such as the Basel implementation timeframe, the definition of capital reserves, and leverage 
ratios. The federal government appears to have raised this issue to the transnational level, placing 
its trust in EU decisions to break up the power structure of its banking sector. By surrendering 
much of the legislative decision in the hands of the European parliament, the German government 
has thus far been able to untie its hands in some cases, as for example with capital requirements 
and liquidity. 
There are however caveats. Berlin has for example been remarkably out of concert with London 
with regards to two particular aspects; disclosure of leverage ratios and treatments of banks that 
own insurance companies. The most prominent discord is with regards to leverage ratios, perhaps 
Europe’s biggest concern. Whereas London has promoted an advanced date for leverage ratio 
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disclosure, Germany is a proponent of a three-year delay to Basel’s original deadline.377 This 
marks a major political issue between the two EU powers, and consequently a split in the unified 
EU stance. The next stage of this process will likely prove more difficult, when EU directives are 
implemented into national legislation. As German banks have already gained concessions at the 
EU stage, it is plausible that they will do so nationally also. 
6.2 Convergence or Divergence? 
6.2.1 Globally 
These cases show that there are indicators of both convergence and divergence between the 
policies for the restructuring of bank regulation following the economic downfall. There is an 
overall agreement upon the factors that are to be tweaked, such as capital requirements and 
leverage, liquidity, and the regulation of risk evaluation. There is also a consensus regarding the 
need to reregulate. On the other hand, it is noticeable that there has been a remarkable lack of 
coordination, as bilateral communication seems to have broken down following the crisis.378 
Arguably the lack of great power alignment has harmed the global efforts by limiting significant 
breakthroughs comparable to those driven by the cooperation of Britain and the US in Basel I 
negotiations. The resulting global standards are therefore strongly indicative of sham standards 
and state divergence. 
Sham Standards 
One particular finding that indicates divergence is the development of the BCBS. Not only does 
this entail the committee’s increased membership, but also the direct results of this increase in the 
form of inability to address pertinent issues. Looking at Basel, the global attempt at reregulation 
has focused on regulating the activities of individual institutions rather than restructure the entire 
system. This leaves the shadow banking system that was so problematic in the escalation of the 
crisis largely intact.  
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Analysts have pointed to this as a major flaw in the global regulatory reform.379 Capital 
requirements do for example not prohibit banks from holding asset portfolios with high 
correlation of returns.380 Simply put, this means that although banks might be sufficiently 
capitalized, the capital they hold depend on the same risks and if a problem is found in one 
institution’s capitalization it is likely to become systemic. In this way, Basel has not made any 
significant developments outside of the committee’s continued dependence upon elaborate 
technical solutions to regulation.   
The general conclusion one can make concerning the global regulatory reform (as opposed to 
individual and internally focused reforms) is, as Tony Porter puts it, that it has not perhaps 
involved aggressive independent promotion of national interests, but rather focused on informal 
groupings and technical standards.381 National competitiveness is mediated through a relegation 
of issues to technical discussions. This indicates a definite disinterest in handling the important 
reforms at the international level and so far results predict a slow and uneven implementation 
with room for deviation between national economies as in the example of sham standards.382 The 
lack of US leadership is likely to have predicated this ambiguity, and the EU has clearly not 
amassed enough influence to decisively impact the situation. 
This indecisiveness comes at the expense of the more difficult governance changes needed.383 
Nicholas Veron notes that in an era of reregulation, it is much more difficult to keep global 
consistency, or convergence, than in times of pacific markets when only light- touch regulation 
seems necessary.384 In reregulation, he claims, decisions are of necessity at least partly 
determined by local politics.385 This has clearly been the case for global banking regulation 
following the global crisis.  
The new BCBS recommendations have not taken any remarkable steps to mitigate the regulatory 
reliance on risk agencies, relying heavily on risk modelling as the method of managing risk rather 
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than governing oversight.386 This specific area marks a convergence between the interests of 
advanced market countries like those analyzed here, where firms have the competitive advantage 
in terms of familiarity with assessment techniques as compared to less developed economies.387 
Most importantly, the outcome clearly favours the US market, as it plays host to most CRAs. The 
political importance of centralized and nationally grounded CRAs further supports the antithesis 
to the assumption that decentralized markets dominate global financial policy.388   
The one significant global move towards handling systemic collapse is the inclusion of leverage 
and liquidity requirements.389 These standards augment the pre-existing capital requirement 
demands by addressing endogenous systemic risks that were previously neglected. This segment 
of Basel indicates that, despite some of its flaws, the accord was a return to increased political 
involvement. 
In conclusion then, the evolution of Basel in terms of membership and purpose indicates that the 
global standards for banking regulation are irrelevant to some of the main concerns of the 
affected members. According to the typologies of international cooperation (see table 2 in section 
‘#$"$#!&IJ!MOSJLOFSMDOFC!LJWGCFSDLY!UDDLPMOFSMDO!ZDPJC’) this suggests that there are disputed 
conflicts between the members of the Committee and therefore policy divergence. 
6.2.2 National dilution 
Concomitantly there is a growing split between Europe and the US that suggests a diverging and 
competitive relationship at the inter-national level. None of the models examined here are 
convincingly similar. One observation that stands out is the intention by all these countries to 
pursue the implementation of international standards through already in-place legislation or 
systems. Doing so suggests that the standards will be significantly diluted as a result of the 
differences noted in this discussion. For instance, the major reforms in the EU proposals are more 
closely aligned with Basel prescriptions as compared to the DFA which is more intent on 
segregating different types of banking as well as reforming the market infrastructure.390 This 
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might reflect the EU’s willingness to revert to internationalism and a general EU respect for 
international norms,391 as opposed to US centripetal individualism.  
Harmonization of standards, as for example through Basel, does not necessarily translate into 
convergence. As noted, the agreement does not handle the most contentious issues, and even 
those areas it does address are mostly handled within the national framework. This has been 
found to be true of other international regulatory regimes also.392 The following discussion will 
revisit some of the specific country impulses and show how focusing on states reveals a 
divergence in policies. 
According to the predictions, we should see a high degree of conflict accompanying IGO sham 
standards. This would indicate no coordination between the states examined below those sham 
standards. Thus, although we would expect "- convergence (between states and an exemplary 
model), these are meaningless as a measurement of convergence in the case of sham standards, 
and we should therefore not see !- convergence (between state models). 
This study has examined policy goals (by looking at the effects of the crisis and international 
intentions), policy content (by looking at specific regulatory requirements), policy instruments 
(by looking at central legislations and actors), and policy styles (by examining banking sectors). 
Amongst these there has been surprising variance. 
6.2.2.1 Policy goals and styles 
The most significant differences are found in the diverging policy goals. All four countries were 
affected differently by the GFC. Canada notably least so, whilst the crisis was particularly 
detrimental to the US’s position as the global leader on financial regulation. These two countries 
were at opposite ends in terms of the imminence of restructuring. This is shown in their 
regulatory overhaul; the US underwent the most complete restructuring of its financial regulation 
while Canada barely went through any. As pointed out, the US system has been reigned in by a 
strong although fragmented bureaucratic reform. This, the DFA will certainly impose major costs 
on the US financial sector, and it could be a cause of concern whether the costs of coordinating it 
with Basel recommendations will be too high and as a consequence neglected.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Europe, in this case Germany and Britain, was also affected by the crisis. This impact has been 
different, as it has prolonged itself extensively. Nevertheless, Europe has the opportunity to assert 
its influence over global finance with the downfall of neoliberal laissez-faire regulation. There 
are major benefits to regional cooperation to counterbalance some of the benefits to 
uncoordinated action. Whilst the economic collapse has left both Canada and Europe in a position 
to fill the void left by the decline of US financial leadership,393 it is the EU that is the most likely 
to do so in divergence. Between Germany and Britain, the latter is definitely the case where the 
most restructuring has taken place. Remarkably, there are few indicators that this restructuring 
has been shaped by path dependency.394 Germany on the other hand, is relying on EU reforms to 
guide its restructuring. Zimmermann argues that Germany’s dependence on the union stems from 
its realization that the chances for the acceptance of its proposals vastly improve with EU 
backing.395 
The selected data brings attention to the US role in leading by example as opposed to doing so 
coercively. This appears to have been the assumption by US authorities also, as Washington was 
the first of leading economies to present a drafted proposal for restructuring. However, this role 
has not been strongly defined by action at the international level. Leading by example can 
nevertheless be a powerful tool. In the case of Basel I, being first in the race to regulate and 
leading the negotiations by example was highly efficient for the US and Britain. Arguably, the 
US has done so alone this time around. The fact that Washington was unable to coordinate with 
the UK in the same way as previously underlines the divergence of the direction of the British 
financial reform. Without Basel to coordinate the global reform, there has been more room for 
divergence, which the countries examined in this study have taken advantage of. 
The international coordination model also suggests that the EU would in the case of global 
competition aim to confront US hegemony. This suggests that the EU will be able to coordinate 
its position on bank regulation. Daniel Mugge finds a U-shaped relationship between the degrees 
of delegation and the European presence on the global stage.396 In this relationship, the 
decisiveness of Europe depends on how power is delegated. If nations are given high degrees of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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autonomy and there is no common European delegation, there will be a high degree of European 
presence, and likewise if a common EU delegation is given substantial authority. On the other 
hand, if neither of these conditions is met, EU members’ hands will be tied. By the predictions of 
this model, the European presence at Basel was significant, as national delegations were given 
priority. A European takeover would be possible if its members are able to coordinate amongst 
each other.397 In fact, we have seen that the EU has been one of the most active actors in the 
negotiations of international financial reform, where it has fronted the widening of regulatory 
scope.398 The position taken by the EU suggests that we are going to witness growing 
transatlantic tensions due to diverging interests.399 
Particularly Germany has strived for Europeanization. However, the process has not been 
seamless and can be argued to be theoretically imposed rather than actual. Nevertheless, with the 
ability to make top down decisions in Brussels, core member state differences should not be 
exaggerated.400 The potential achievements of EU cooperation have also increased with the 
inefficiency of Basel. This has added weight to the benefits of inter-EU cooperation and 
subsequent competition with other great powers. With more room to manoeuvre, it is not 
surprising that the union has asserted itself. 
The US has already shown through the neglected implementation of Basel II that its willingness 
to accept costs related to financial regulatory reform is reluctant at best. On the other hand, the 
benefits of coordinating on banking standards do seem enticing enough for Washington to accept 
the governing consensus on necessary regulatory categories, such as capital requirements, 
leverage, and liquidity. The significance of this is the inferred possibility of the coexistence of 
overarching international standards and such blatant principal differences such as the Volcker 
rule. This suggests that US authorities do not trust international standards to sufficiently stabilize 
its banking system. 
The global sham standards and consequent national policy autonomy has been important to 
Canada. Although Ottawa’s standards, such as the definition of leverage, sometimes deviate from 
their US counterparts, they do not by themselves signify an intentional challenge to US standards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in light of the lacking Canadian leadership in international negotiations.401 Canada was unable to 
successfully lobby its high standards for leverage targets on the global stage. This shows that 
Canada by itself imposing higher standards than the US does not threaten the US position on 
these standards. Its otherwise passenger role in Basel demonstrates Ottawa’s reluctance to 
globally challenge its neighbour. Canada has managed to avoid this at the same time as ensuring 
the possibility of preserving its status quo regulatory regime. This is possible due to the national 
divergence that is allowed by the impotent global governance. 
The breakup of the Basel club arguably affects the freedom of Canada to experiment with other 
allies. In its involvement in the recent negotiations, Canada appeared interested in protecting its 
autonomy. In addition, the US’s coercive influence has been reduced without the normative 
backing of the IGO together with the deflated influence of the Anglo-American model. 
Depending on future development we could see Canada approach the EU further with the 
potential cementing of the EU model. However, in the face of increased divergence and the 
possible competition emerging, Canada is expected to conform to its neighbour. With Canadian 
banks adapting to new US regulation, Canada’s incentive to partner with the EU decreases.  
6.2.2.2 Policy content 
Noticeably, there has been a split in weighting of these different factors as shown in the variance 
in policy content. There are diverging understandings for how to implement the main policy 
instrument, capital requirements, specifically in terms of defining eligible capital. Furthermore, 
with regards to leverage, the US and Canada both have prior measures intended to curb 
irresponsible behaviour whereas Europe’s banks have mostly been unregulated in this regard and 
consequently entered dire straits. It is predictable that the most resistance given to increased 
stringency in capital requirements are voiced by German actors, as Germany is the country most 
reliant on banks for the functioning of its financial system. There also appears to be a definite 
opening for a transatlantic split over the implementation of the new standards. This split has been 
augmented by the advancing bank crisis in the Eurozone, both separating Europe from the 
recovering US as well as underlining the importance of cooperation and European unity. 
However this crisis has also decreased the financial clout of the EU and might make it more 
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difficult to emphasize its leadership and perhaps driving outliers like the UK away from the 
continental position. 
The political coordination of EU regulators has also been an interesting development to this 
debate. EU institutions with the exclusive right to introduce new legislation have undertaken a u-
turn in their most recent position, abandoning their political alliance with London-based financial 
coalitions. This evidence questions the explanatory power of structural power or convergence 
theory, as it would predict the opposite occurring.402 Eliot Posner points to signs that officials in 
Brussels have reached out to other more prudent groups for an integrationist coalition that is more 
importantly based on a different set of regulatory principles compared with those of London.403 In 
this reconfiguration the US model was also considered and concluded to be politically 
unacceptable as a model to the European regulatory reform.404 In Europe, conscious choices are 
being made to the evolution of the Union’s financial model, and these choices seem to be 
bringing it further away from the Anglo-American model. 
As discussed, the US has tried to take an indirect leadership role in framing the new global 
financial governance through its own internal reforms found in the DFA. By doing so they have 
given a clear signal for how they stand politically in the ongoing restructuring. It should be noted 
that the independent solution is a natural response to the global perception that the US could 
somehow be blamed for the crisis and not necessarily a politically driven attempt to distance the 
American reform from that of the global level. Nevertheless, both these factors point to a 
distinguishable US paradigm for the construction of its policy content. Firstly, Washington has 
defined its reform through the DFA and secondly, there is a global perception of a (flawed) US 
system that has led to other states distancing themselves from this system. 
One of the major differences relates to Universal banking. Queries concerning universal banking 
have re-emerged as part of the discussion of systemic collapse. Reforms are found in both the UK 
and the US, the two countries most dependent on their financial system for financing. Of the two 
cases, the Vickers and Volcker reforms, the American Volcker Rule is the one that directly 
inhibits universal banking, whereas the UK’s Vickers ringfence only interferes with the transfer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of funds between affected and non-affected sectors. These individual initiatives are a major 
illustration of the way that jurisdiction-specific regulatory solutions have become more prevalent 
following the crisis.405  
The reluctance towards universal banking has historical precedence in both the US and the UK.406 
As mentioned, both countries saw the incentives for change rise with the spread of the crisis and 
disillusionment with the Anglo-American model, and it is therefore not surprising that the biggest 
changes are happening here. Evidently these two countries aim towards finding their own 
individual solutions to systemic collapse rather than promoting these to the international level. 
This reluctance to do so points to prominent difficulties between countries. The fact that these 
issues cannot be adopted at the Basel forum shows that the highly technical discussion neglects 
bigger systemic deviations. 
6.2.2.3 Policy instruments 
As seen in the section presenting the data, the two main instruments worth discussing in this 
context are the DFA and the fourth CRD. This is because Canada has not passed any overarching 
reform legislation and Britain and Germany are highly coordinated with the CRD. Where the 
DFA was noticeably conditional on national imperatives, CRD 4 is remarkably international in its 
reliance on Basel agreements.  
For the US, the nature of the DFA makes shying away from major reforms probable. The 
preference of the financial sector of the US economy has been substantial enough to ensure that 
the overhaul fits in the vein of previous policies. There are enough uncertainties in the DFA to 
enable lobbyists to disarm it in its future development. As discussed, many analysts are 
concerned that the Act will not be the overhaul it aims to be. It is vague with regards to 
addressing pre-existing channels of financial alchemy. Furthermore, it is assumed that the Act 
gives incentives to the continuation of the type of creativity that led to the GFC. These are all 
signs that market forces influence US policies. 
On the other hand, there are major attempts at regulatory recapture, particularly in the return to 
American scepticism of universal banking with the Volcker Rule. This is a decisive turn away !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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from any converging format for bank regulation in itself. Highly autonomous, the Volcker 
decision could cause problems with other countries aiming to standardize banking across borders. 
The rule would impose significant costs on foreign banks wanting to incorporate in the US 
market. 
As pointed out, the EU’s banking sector is coordinated through the CRD and in a particularly 
detailed way in the fourth version. This version inhibits the diverging interpretations that have 
characterized earlier efforts, particularly in terms of capital requirements (article 87). However, 
the direction the EU has taken is practically distinct from that of the US in that they have mostly 
waited for an international decision prior to instigating any internal reform. Possibly, this reflects 
the decentralized authority structure of the EU, where external legitimacy could strengthen an 
internal decision. 
6.3 Competition- Divergence? 
There are significant benefits to global regulatory coordination, mostly to do with reduced 
transaction costs,407 but also related to global consistency and stability. These benefits have 
lingered in agreement since the first Basel accord, where they were prominently discussed as a 
reaction to the chaos of the previous bank failures. The established tradition of recognizing these 
benefits has perhaps been the most important reason as to why a third round of negotiations has 
been attempted. However, there has been a major shift in the functions of Basel that inhibits the 
plausibility of international coordination. This has increased the price of cooperation in the 
regulator’s dilemma that encapsulates global financial regulation by increasing the diversity of 
actors. The increasing diversity of members as well as increasing number of smaller powers that 
might coordinate to oppose great power capture of the organization (as shown in the first Basel 
accord negotiations) has emphasized the difficulties of coordination.  
Previously the discussion has centred on the differences between laissez-faire regulation and 
prudent oversight, whereas the GFC brought on a new wave of global regulation and 
subsequently normalized prudency. This dedication to reregulate had a global effect, although not 
all of the countries in this analysis took an individual part of it, and they all pursued this vague 
goal differently. Both Canada and Germany have been slow to implement major changes to their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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financial regulation. As has been discussed, this is due to Canada’s success coming out of the 
turmoil and Germany’s expectations for European cooperation, and therefore can also be 
considered reactions to the crisis. 
In Drezner’s international standards coordination game, the EU is a clear candidate to oppose US 
hegemony, thus also making EU members good candidates for this analysis. The EU has perhaps 
taken its strongest stance to date (in relation to banking regulation) with the fourth CRD. This 
directive inhibits national deviations as well as dictates a coordinated European stance on Basel 
III. It also points to a stronger European acceptance of international decisions than found in the 
US. It is difficult to compare US and EU models however, particularly as the decision-making 
process in the US and the EU are markedly different both in terms of timing and structure.408 
Therefore an obstacle is arguing the existence of a united Europe comparable to the US. When 
studying the country cases, Britain seems to be very much on the fence on the matter and could 
be a deciding factor in whether the EU becomes a legitimate contender to the US. The 
implications of the DFA could be decisive in driving the UK to coordinate with the rest of 
Europe. Reluctance to accept the threats of the DFA on global competitiveness seems to be an 
important factor also bringing Canada to criticize the American reforms. 
If we compare the case of coordinating the current regulatory reform with the process witnessed 
in the Basel I negotiations, it is clear that there has been no solidified leader on global standards. 
Whereas Basel I relied on the regulatory coordination of Britain and the US, there has been no 
such regulatory capture in the most recent process. Furthermore, the US has been unable to 
capture Basel by itself. This is an important finding as it indicates that either there has been a 
change in the financial regulatory alignment between the US and the UK or that the nature of 
Basel has somehow changed and regulatory capture is no longer possible. Arguably both of these 
instances have occurred. These findings point to if not a regulatory competition, then at least 
significant divergence in the policies governing the banks of the US, Canada, Britain and 
Germany.  
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7. Conclusion 
Rather than accept the assumptions of neoliberal convergence theory, that globalization in terms 
of market forces national institutions to converge in regulatory policy, this paper has attempted to 
revaluate this claim. Empirically grounded in a detailed study of banking regulation in four 
countries, the United States, Canada, Britain and Germany, it has been argued that there is 
divergence in the global regulation of banking. 
A better understanding of global trends has been presented by looking at the puzzle through an 
assessment of national interests, rather than assuming that global market structures 
overwhelmingly dominate the policies that regulate global banking. Through evaluating these 
interests we have observed diverging policies in the technical regulations that govern this sector. 
This study has conceptualized national bank regulation through the subcategories of policy goals, 
policy content, policy instruments, and policy styles based on Bennett’s definition of policy 
convergence. Empirics from the four country cases have then been analyzed using Legro and 
Moravcik’s two-step analysis. Comparisons of all these categories indicate divergence in the 
regulation of banks. This supports the hypothesis that there is divergence in the way that 
countries regulate banking. 
According to the framework of international cooperation, one of the indicators of such diverging 
behaviour is the evolution of the BCBS. Club international governmental organization affiliation 
no longer characterizes the coordination of global banking regulation. On the other hand 
traditions still linger and an attempt has been made to use the existing channels of 
communications of the BCBS to form some sort of agreement. The lack of discipline in this 
agreement gives it the potential to be the turning point when regulating global banking evolved 
from club negotiation to sham standards. Without a credible overarching global regime to draw 
on, states are left to rely on their own resources. 
The void caused by the economic collapse has given both Canada and Europe the opportunity to 
challenge US financial leadership, however developments are still too premature to evaluate 
whether this will happen. Based on the predictions given in this study, we should see an 
increasing competition between influential states. 
! A?!
7.1 Ideas for further research: 
To further evaluate the findings of this study it could be telling to conduct an assessment of 
whether the new levels for capital requirements, liquidity requirements and leverage standards 
have any effect on financial stability. Have they corralled problematic banking policies or do they 
perpetuate the laissez faire interests of the banking sector? Finding an answer to this question 
could shed light on the evolution of sham standards. 
It will furthermore be interesting to follow up on the development of competition between 
influential states. One way of doing this is to assess the complete implementation of Basel 
agreements when their final phase-in is complete. Such a study should evaluate how intently 
states are in adhering to these agreements, and how important existing legislative frameworks are 
in shaping their implementation. 
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